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Foreign aid ha s become a traditional part of t he 
forei gn policy of the United States, but in t he elev en yea r s 
since t he enactment of t he Marshall P l an t here has been a 
steady increase o f opposition to f orei gn a i d pr ogr ams. The 
votes in t he Sena te in f avor of t he Marsha ll P lan were 4.06 
times the negative votes. Ten years l a ter, in 1958, t he "yea" 
votes in t he Senate on t he Mutua l Security Administra tion bill 
were 3.00 times as many a s t he "nay" votes. The votes in t he 
House fo r these same two years show an even greater manifes-
tation of a growing opposition t o forei gn a id. In 1948 t he 
affirma tive votes were 4o48 greater than t he negative, whi le 
in 1958 the figure drops to 1.93. 
While only two out of t he e i ght Kansans in Congress 
voted against the Marshall P lan in 1948, three voted agai nst 
the Mutual Security Act in 1958, and Sena tor Schoeppel, who 
did not vote, was known to be against t he billo This indi-
cates that the Kansas Senators and Repres enta tives in Wash-
ington have roughly followed the nationa l trend of a mounting 
opposition to foreign aid bills (3.00 more 11yea 11 votes a s "nay " 
votes in 1948 as compared to 2.00 more "yea" votes than 11na y 11 
votes in 1958). 
Throughout this study the writer has attempted to 
show why this opposition has increased as far a s t he Kansans 
were concerned. Speeches, both in and out of Congress as well 
as the public sta tements of t he Kansas Senators and Represent-
atives for the period 1948 to 1959 were checked in an attempt 
to a scertain why these men voted as they did. A study was 
a lso made of the Congressional Record, t he Topeka Daily 
Capital, the Hutchinson News-Hera ld, the Garden City Dai ly 
Telegram, the :Emporia Gazette, and t he Kansa s City Star. 
Letters of inquiry were also submitted to these men. 
It is the considered opinion of t he au t hor tha t t he 
main reason for the Kansans vot i ng in f avor of forei gn aid 
was basically due to the agricultural interest of their 
State. Many of the Senators and. Representatives from Kansa s 
have attempted to solve t he problem of surpluses in agricul-
tural commodities by foreign aid legislation. The majority 
of these men who voted in f avor of foreign aid hoped t hat 
these p lans would permit the flow of agricultural commodities 
to the rest of the world. This would, a s t hey believ ed, solve 
the problem of hunger in t he world while solvi ng t he problem 
of surp luses in t he United States. 
Tha t feeding hungry peop le is a humanitari an pur pose 
cannot be disputed, but to feed t he hungr y of t he wor l d and 
collect a return f or t he food is a degree beyond a human-
ita ri an purpose. The Kansans wan t ed t he United Sta t e s to be 
the chief source of food for t he wo rld, yet t hey wan ted t he 
United States to be justly compensated for their fo od in the 
form of foreign curren cies, ~trategic materi a ls or mi l i t a r y 
defen se in Eu rope 
Not all the Kansans believed foreign aid would solve 
the agricultural surplus problem in the United States. Those 
men who voted 11 nay 11 on foreign aid measures argued t hat a 
better and a cheaper plan could be legislated to solve the 
surplus problem. They believed that foreign a id measures were 
not the best defensive maneuver the United States could 
utilize for security in the world. They believed t he money 
collected from taxpayers of the United States could be used 
to gain the real advantages of security for t he nation.- The 
key to this security for the United States was a financially 
sound nation, one that built its military defenses upon its 
own shores, not the far-off shores of foreign countries. 
Although the form of foreign aid has changed consid-
erably,- such as in the form of the Point Four Program (assis-
tance to underdeveloped countries, Mutual Security Adminis-
tration, or the International Loan Fund; t he debate in 
Congress concerning foreign aid has not actua lly changed. 
Those arguments that were used in 1948 were used in 1959. 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Foreign aid to Europe has long been a controversial 
topic in the United States. Two points of view have been 
expressed regarding the beginnings of the United States 
forei gn aid programs. One school of thought is that the 
program of foreign aid to Europe started with the Lend-
lease program of 1940. The second is that the program was 
initiated in a period of international peace with its actual 
beginnings made known to the public in the address g iven at 
Harvard on June 5, 1947 by Secretary of State George Catlett 
Marshall. This study reco gnizes the second school of thought , 
and since the author is more concerned with presenting the 
attitudes of the Kansas Senators and Representa tives in 
United States Congres ses from 1948 to 1959 relative to the 
Marshall Flan, little mention will be made of the first two 
phases of the entire aid to Europe program, which were the 
Greek-Turkish Loan, commonly known as the Truman Doctrine, 
and the European Interim Aid Program. 
The Marshall Plan legislation was officially known as 
the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, or as it was known in 
actual operation, the Economic Cooperation Administration ( ECA). 
These names will be used interchangeably in this study. After 
1951, foreign aid to Europe no longer was classified as the 
2 
Marshall Plan or as the ECA but was known as the Mutual 
Security Administration. The year 1951 marks the beg inning 
of a shift from purely economic aid to military aid, and this 
change is distinctly noted by the implications of the title 
for the aid programs, the Mutual Security Administration (MSA). 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The purpose of this study is to examine the attitudes 
and the opinions expressed publicly by the Kansas Senators 
and Representatives in the United States Congress relative 
to foreign aid to Europe as it was enacted during the years 
of 1947 to 1959. This study will cover the Marshall Plan 
(ECA) and the Mutual Security Administration (MSA) to 1 959. 
Other fo~ns of aid programs, such as the 1947 Greek-Turkish 
Loan, will be mentioned only intermittently as a comparison 
for the Marshall Plan. 
Chapter II is a brief discussion of the Marshall Plan, 
how it originated and was enacted. This brief discourse is 
by no means a complete one. It is intended to be only an 
introduction to the overall legislative problems produc~d by 
the Marshall Proposal and some of the basic solutions employed 
to solve these difficulties. A quick survey of the Congress-
ional attitude toward the Marshall Plan measure is outlined 
in Chapter II. 
In Chapter III, the arguments supporting the voting 
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records of the United States Senators from Kansas on European 
aid are presented. This chapter is only a survey of the 
various positions of these men. No final conclus ions are 
drawn from the surveys. The conclusions of these Senators, 
drawn as neatly into one basic summarization for each indi-
vidual man as research would permit, will be found in Chapter 
v. This conclusive chapter is also applicable to Chapter IV, 
which describes the voting records of the United States 
Representatives from Kansas. 
LIMITATIONS AND SOURCES 
Statements, formal letters, and newsletters rel eased 
by the Senators and Representatives should be the chief 
sources used in discovering the true opinions of these men. 
Due to the difficulty of obtaining such correspondence, 
heightened by incompleteness of files for newsletters and 
letters, speeches not recorded or not kept, or the inaccu-
racies of verbal memory, the author was forced to confine 
his attention, almost exclusively, to documented statements 
found 1n the Congressional Record or the more secondary news-
paper comments pertaining to this subject matter. However, 
informal statements from the men surveyed in this report, 
who are still living and who were willing to make comments, 
were obtained by the writer. In most cases, these statements, 
in letter form, supplemented the declarations already published 
in the Congressional Record or in the various newspapers 
used by the author. 
Few secondary source books may be utilized in 
connection with the survey of Kansas Senators and Repre-
sentatives. To a large degree, the material from secondary 
sources reviewed for this study has been used only in Chap-
ter II, the brief history of the Marshall Plan. 
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No attempt ha s been made here to exhaust the material 
available on foreign aid to Europe. Only the material directly 
concerned with the Kansas Congressmen and the specific 
problem of forei gn aid to Europe was used. Five Kansas 
newspapers were covered thoroughly with particular attention 
given to the Congressional election years and the periods of 
time when foreign aid measures were being debated in the 
Congress. A study was made of some of the major n ewspapers 
in Kansas from the newspaper files at the Kansas State His-
torical Society Library at Topeka, Kansas. Newspapers used 
for this study were the Topeka Daily Capital, Hutchinson 
News-Herald, Garden City Daily Telegram, Emporia Gazette, 
and the Kansas City Star. The Salina Journal and the Wichita 
Beacon were also studied. These two newspapers, however, 
were not as extensively covered as the other five newspapers. 
This study is not an attempt to solve the riddle of 
foreign aid. The author is not advocating any aid program, 
nor does the author wish to imply any malice toward foreign 
CHAPTER II 
A HISTORY OF THE MARSHALL PLAN 
Immediately following World War II the many political, 
social, and military, as well as economic problems of Western 
Europe, the Middle East, and Asia came to be regarded as 
arising from economic difficulties. The solution to all 
these problems was therefore felt by the United States 
Government to be an economic one. It was the rush of events 
in the winter of 1947 that led the Policy Planning Staff of 
the United States State Department to seek an expedient 
capable of solving the troubles of a Greek Civil War, a 
remedy for the economic quandary causing hunger in Western 
Europe, and, in general, a policy capabl e of dealing wi th the 
threat of communist expansion over these territories. Past 
efforts such as the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration and earlier American loans which had been 
utilized, to sti~ulate the economic heartbeat of the war-
wrecked world, were coming to an end, yet recovery had not 
been attained. 1 
This tenebrous scene was at its nadir in Greece, a 
country where the government had been plung ed into rebellion, 
1John C. Campbell et al., The United States in World 
Affairs, 1947-1948 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), 
p. 27. 
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and where economic conditions within the country itself 
hindered the recovery of that government from its chaotic 
situation. The instability of Turkey also presented a 
disturbing situation. When it seemed nothing short of 
military and economic aid to Greece would save the falling 
government, Secretary of State George Marshall gave new 
hope in a speech delivered in Cambridge, Massachusetts on 
June 5, 1947. 2 In the body of that speech Marshall in-
serted the idea of providing aid to European nations who 
would, through a process of self-help, cooperate with the 
United States to regain or rebuild their economic strength 
in an effort to ward off communism. The people of the United 
States were thus introduced to the idea of peace-time eco-
nomic aid to Europe, and with the crisis in Europe caused by 
the two relentless pressures of Soviet expansion and eco-
nomic poverty, the first of which was simultaneously pro-
moted by the second, the concept rapidly attracted many 
friends. Few American people disputed the challenge of 
Sovi e t ambition,3 and the recent adjournment of the Moscow 
conference brought little if any hop e of accomplishing world 
peace. The speech was timely in that the opposition to 
2Ibid. 
3James W. Wiggins and Helmut Schoeck, Fore-:1:gn Aid 
Re-examined (Wash i ngton, D. c.: · Public Affairs Press, 1958), 
p. 1. 
internationalism, composed of the seemingly always present 
isolationist bloc in the United States, had little material 
to present to the citizens of the United States that they 
would accept as counterevidence to the policy of inter-
national cooperation because of the European crisis. 4 
The Harvard Speech stressed a broader arrangement 
than economic aid to Greece and Turkey, later known as the 
Truman Doctrine, which had been under Congressional dis-
cussion during March and April of 1947. This dividing line 
· between the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall plan was the 
concept of economically aiding all of Europe through the 
broader Marshall Plan rather than just aiding Greece and 
Turkey; the wider Marshall Plan, however, stimulated many 
arguments after the ultimate passag e of the Greek-Turkish 
aid bill. Some Congressmen could accept the Greek-Turk ish 
aid but could not support a more general economic plan: 
that of aid to all of Europe. 
INTERIM AID 
President Harry s. Truman summoned the members of 
Congr ess to a special session on October 23, 1947, giving 
two reasons for the necessity of having this session as, 
8 
¾arry Bayard Price, The Marshall Plan and Its Meaning 
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1955J,p. 25. 
Hereinafter cited as Price, Marshall Plan. 
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first, the crisis in Western Europe and, second, the infla -
tionary conditions within the United States. 5 The President 
believed action on emergency relief appropriations could not 
wait until January inasmuch as France urgently requested 
$357,000,000 and Italy $285,000,000. 6 
On November 17, 1947, one month after the opening 
of the special session, Public Law 389 was passed sending 
$522,000,000 to France, Italy, and Austria in a stopgap 
measure. 7 
I SOLA TI ONI SM 
The Eightieth Congress was Republican in compo sition 
and was dedicated to a reduction in taxes and in the amount 
of government spending. One particular faction of the 
Republican Party built its Presidential hopes around a 
traditional American premis e , isolationism. This wing 
coincided with the conservative Midwestern representation, 
whi le the internationalist component, the liberal branch of 
the Party, was a product of the coastal areas. Almost a 
5rbid., pp. 47-48. The session was to commence on 
Nov ember 17, 1947. 
6New York Times, October 4, 1947. 
7Price•, Marshall Plan, p. 48. The interim Aid Program 
was continued in the Eightieth Congress, First Session (Pub-
lic Law 393 passed on March 31, 1948) which appropriated an 
additional $55,000,000 more. Total Interim Aid was $577,000,000 . 
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third of the Republican Party in this Congress of 1948 
"constituted an irreconcilably isolationist bloc, 118 but 
the Administration counted on the rest of the members of 
the Republican Party in Congress to follow bipartisan tactics. 
Whether isolationism ever existed is a question raised 
by critics who study American history. Some feel that if 
isolationists hold that the United States must not engage 
in international conduct, then isolationism never existed. 
In their new interpretation of the term, the critics describe 
isolationism as a political tool used by ce,rtain Congressmen, 
even with the realization that withdrawal from international 
cooperation was not possible, as an emotional appeal to voters 
confused over United States foreign policy. These Congress-
men were particularly connected with the "America First 11 
school of thought and are by all rights "Disillusionists. 119 
They should have realized the United States could not live 
apart from the rest of the world. Many of the constituents 
8Brad.ford H. Westerfield, Forei gn Policy and Party 
Politics: Pearl Harber to Korea {New Haven: Yale Univ ersity 
Press, 1955}, p. 34. Hereinafter cited as Westerfield, 
Foreign Policy. 
9samuel Lubell, Revolt of the Moderates (New York : 
Harper and Brothers, 1956), p.79-.-According to Lubell a 
dis1llusion1st ls a Congressman who relates the evils of 
internationalism and attempts to win his Congressional seat 
on a platform of isolationism. He is called a dis1llus1onist 
because he quite frequently distorts the actual facts. 
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who are thus exploited by this political means are people 
with ethnic prejudices, namely pro-German or anti-British, 
who are usually found in the Midwest. They are the 11 Russian-
German11 farmers in Kansas, Iowa, Nebraska, North and. South 
Dakota who display an opposition to military service as well 
as certain phases of Americanization. 10 Since the Midwest 
is in the interior of the nation, the people of this section 
are likely to feel more secure, more able to live apart from 
the other countries of the world, than coastal residents. 
Remarkable political ramifications of this geographical 
isolationism are as follows: (1) isolationists used their 
philosophy as a. tool against a President of the opposite 
party, as for example against New Deal economic appeal; 
(2) isolationism declines when the Republicans are in power 
and revives if the Republican Party is defeated; (3) sentiment 
for 11 America First" is found to be stronger in rural Am erica 
than in urban; and (4) Democrats are more likely to vote 
internationalist than Republicans. 11 The term g iven to those 
Congressmen who utilize the votes of the disillusioned is 
11 pseudo- conservatives. 1112 
lOLubell, The Future of American Politics, pp. 132-146. 
11Lubell, Revolt of the Moderates, pp. 100-101. 
12naniel Bell (ed.), The New American Right (New York: 
Criterion Books, 1955), p. 35. Bell borrows the term pseudo 
conservative from Theodore W. Adorne's The Authoritarian 
Personality (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950). As Bell 
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HARRIMAN COMMITTEE 
The "Harriman Committee," named after the chairman 
of the committee, Wi lliam Averell Harriman, who had been 
appointed as the Secretary of Commerce in the Truman Ad-
ministration on October of 1946, had been appointed by Sec-
retary of State Dean Gooderham Acheson on June 22, 1947, 
as chairman of President Truman's Committee of Foreign Aid 
on the recommendation of Senator Arthur Hendrick Vandenberg 
following the Marshall speech on June 5, 1947. The duty of 
this nonpartisan committee as announced by the Administration 
was to study the plan proposed by Marshall and the State 
Department. In the committee report on its conclusions, 
European Recovery and American Aid, submitted to the Presi-
dent on November 7, 1947, 13 the committee agreed that Europe 
interprets the Adorno writing, the pseudo conservative "is 
a man who, in the name of upholding traditional American 
values and institutions and defending them against more or 
less fictitious dan~ers, consciously or unconsciously aims 
at their abolition. He describes the nation as being on the 
brink of ruin from plots within its own boundaries. He de-
tests communism, but shows little interest in realistic ap-
proaches that might destroy it or strengthen his own country 
against communism. He is content to view only the domestic 
scene, and has a tendency of portraying his country as weak; 
being deluded by the democratic nations of Western Europe, 
which seem to antagonize his concern more than Soviet Commu-
nism; and he is against all "give-away programs 11 directed at 
strengthening forei§n nations. Bell believes that the "new 
psuedo-conservatism is nothing more than the old "ultra-con-
servatism ••• heightened by the extraordinary pressures of the 
contemporary world," heavy taxes, dissolution of urban life, 
and con sideration of partisan political expediency. 
13Price, Marshall Plan, p. 42. 
13 
was in dire need of economic aid from the United States. 
HERTER COMMITTEE 
Another committee was established on July 29, 1947, 
by the House of Representatives to study the Marshall pro-
posal. The committee was commonly known as the "Herter 
Committee" because Representative Christian Archibald Herter 
was in charge of the delegation while it was overseas. 14 
Influential in the creation of this committee was Speaker 
of the House Joseph William Martin, Jr., who named Repre-
sentative Charles Aubrey Eaton as chairman and Herter as 
vice-chairman. The objective of this group was self-edu-
cat i on. The membership of the committee was truly biparti-
san as it was extracted from the Foreign Affairs Committee 
and from the body of the Hou se accordi ng to geographical 
representation. On August 28, 1947, the assemblage sailed 
for Europe with questionnaires prepared with State Depart-
ment assistance. Sub-committees visited every nation in 
Europe except Russia, Yugoslavia, and Albania . 
Many members of this group returned to the United 
States with a deeper convi ction for the necessity of Ameri-
can leadership and aid. The firsthand study gave t he members 
of this committee a chance to vi ew the actual conditions in 
1 4rbid., p. 51. 
14 
Europe free from the political controversies in the United 
States. Consequently, upon their return, they proposed a 
foreign aid recommendation to the Foreign Affairs Committee. 
This testimony, stressing maximum self-help of the European 
countries in a program of aid by the United States, innu-
enced the passage of the European Recovery Program in 1948. 
The influence of the members of the committee was apparent 
both at home in their own constituencies and in the Halls of 
Congress. Without a bipartisan approach many feel the pro-
15 gram of foreign aid would not have had Congressional a pproval. 
Such recommendations as production and production 
management, utilization of resources, local currency counter-
part funds, the relationship of Germany to European re·covery, 
American participation, and acquisition of strategic and 
other materials by the United States were included in the 
16 Committee's 883-page report. 
KRUG REPORT 
On June 22, 1947, President Truman appointed a com-
mittee under the chairmanship of Secretary of the Interior 
Julius Albert Krug to investigate the ability of the United 
States to conduct a foreign aid program by ascertaining the 
15Price, Marshall Plan, p. 55. 
16Ibid., p. 54. 
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impact that such a measure would hav e on the United Stat .s s 
economy. Listed in the report, publ ished on October 19 , 
1947, as the National Resources an£ Forei i:i:n Aid, were t hree 
major world shortag es: foods and nitrogen fertilizers; 
coal for industrial pl ants; and steel, basic to all recon-
struction programs and me chanica l equipment. 17 The conclusion 
of this committee was t ha t t he economic security of the 
nation would not be ruined by a forei gn aid progra.m. 18 This 
report was an importan t compila tion of facts and fi gures 
which was reviewed in Congress. 
NOURSE REPORT 
Whereas the Krug Report determined t he ability of 
t he Unit ed States to engage in a forei gn aid program withou t 
too severe economic consequences , the Nourse Report, sub -
mitted by t h e second c ommittee activated within the Admin-
istration by Truman on June 22, 1947, to participate in 
a study of the Marshall Plan, rela ted the fact that these 
commodi ties mentioned in the Krug Report wer e scarce 
mate r ials even in the United States; and if such materials 
were sent abroad., the United States would be r equ ired to use 
17Robert E. Summers , Economic Aid 1£ Europe: The 
Marshall Plan (New York: The H. W. Wilson Company, 1948), 
p. 62.-Hereinafter cited as Summers , Econom ic Aid. 
18Price, Marshall Plan, p. 40. 
16 
certain measures, both domestically and. abroad, to ensure 
efficient distribution overseas as well as the collection of 
these goods in the United States. Such extents of regulation 
of the United States economy, as proposed by this Nourse 
Committee headed by the Council of Economic Advisers with 
Edwin Griswold Nourse as the chairman, would require export 
controls, allocations for domestic use, discouragement of 
misuse or excessive use, efficient transportation and dis-
tribution, and the curbing of speculation and hoardi ng of 
goods. 19 
REPUBLICANS I N CONGRESS 
Unanimity existed in Congress on one general expression 
of the controversial subject, the threat of communist ex-
pansion over the free world. Disagreemen t arose in for-
malizing a policy or policies to meet the dang er of this peril. 
There were many different opinions as to what solution should 
be a pplied to the existing situation, and with 1948 being an 
election year , the debate on technicalities seemed incessant. 
The Democratic party was in power in the White House, but the 
convening Eightieth Congress was Republican controlled, 
ostensibly committed to a progr am of tax reduction. The 
19summers, Economic Aid, p. 69. The r9port of the 
Council of Economic Advisers , The Impact of Foreign Aid 
upon the Domestic Economy: ! Report to the President 12.I the 
Council of Economic Advisers (Washington, 1947), was sub-
mitted onOctober 28, 1947. 
17 
enactment of the Marshall Plan would seemingly b e an ob-
struction to that desired goal, and the people had not had 
a chance to express their opinions on the Marshall Plan as 
the events leading to the proposal had occurred since the 
last election. Therefore, the Congressmen were in a position 
that called for the use of their own judgment. Character-
istically, the Eightieth Congress had viewed European a ffairs 
bipartisanly as a traditional carry-over of war time politics, 
yet partisanly enough to have some degree of debate. It 
b ecam e unmistakably clear that the liberal Republicans were 
will ing to join the Democrats in support of the Marshall 
Plan legislation. The conservative Republicans, however, 
maintained a partisan front. 20 The liberal Republ icans, in 
relation to foreign affairs, outnumbered the conserv a tive 
branch of the party, a factor which encourag ed an ov er-all 
bipartisan approach to a forei gn policy. 
With the above division in the· Republ ic an Party de-
veloping early in January, 1948, each facet of the split 
Republican Party looked for a leader. Senator .Arthur 
Vand enberg, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, 
labeled by many a s a long-standing isola tionist, reversed 
his position, and moved in the dir ection which made him the 
likely candida te for the leader of the party section that 
20westerfield, Foreign Policy, p. 33. 
18 
would advocate and follow President Truman's foreign aid 
policy. He promptly took t he r eins of lea.dership by having 
a.n extended series of discussions with the President and his 
Secretary of State. Later, h e stood before a packed Senate 
to introduce the proposed leg islation in acceptably un-
qualified temper on March 1, 1948. 21 He had t he absolute 
backing of his Foreign Relations Committee when he stated 
tha t "famine, disease and disast er will stalk a desperate 
Europe1' unless emergency aid was sent i mmediate ly to that 
part of the world. 22 There is little doubt t hat Vandenberg 
played an i mportan t role in holding the Midwest partisan 
vote to a minimum during 1947 and 1948. 
Vandenberg, however, was not unoppos ed . Senator 
Robert Alphonso Taft indirectly led the opposition, an 
opposition not clearly defined . Those who supported the 
aid plan did so in varying degrees, almost to the point of 
confusion, which resulted in lengthy debate. Taft was 
bolstered by the Midwest ern bloc at all times and at various 
moments by those of fluctuating sympathy for aid approval , 
including the groups partial to cuts in appropriations. 
Taft' s major handicap was his l ack of a.n alternate plan. 23 
21Price, Marshall Flan, p. 63. 
22Arthur H. Vand enberg, Jr. (ed.), The Priv ate P~pers 
of Senator Vandenbers (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952), 
p. 373. Hereinafter cited as Vandenberg, Private Papers. 
23summers, Economic fil, p. 234. 
19 
Because of the perplexities of the situation, Taft resigned 
himself to domestic matters, rarely associat ing with the 
foremost noninterventionist bloc of the economy-minded Re-
publicans. Thus the opposition force was faced with two 
serious problems : t h ey found the American peopl e generally 
favoring legislation directed at halting communist expansion, 
and they found Taft's leadership was not in the realm of 
internat ional affairs. Both adversities left the advocates 
of the Marshall Plan better organi zed, stronger, and more 
active than their opponents. 
Members of both sections maneuvered behind the l eader-
ship of Vandenberg or Taft. Republican House memb ers u sually 
affiliated with either of the, two sides; however, the lines 
were not as distinct in the House as they were in the Senate, 
because there were no Republicans of prominence in t he House 
to as sume leadership. In the Hou se most of the promotion 
work for the Marshall Plan was l eft to the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, which witnessed little assistance or opposition 
from pressure grou ps of either Democratic or Republ ican Party 
leadership. 
THE DENO CRATS I N CONGRESS 
President Truman had solidarity among his Democratic 
friends in the Congress in most instances in relation to 
the Marshall proposal. A left-wing defection had sprouted 
20 
in Congress over "New Deal" and "Fair Deal" policies in 
general under the leadership of Henry Agard Wallace, editor 
of the New Republic and formally a member of President 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt's cabinet. Wallace, however, did 
not attra.ct many Democrat adherents either on national a ffairs 
or international policies. The main Democratic controversies 
in Congress over legislative measures stemmed from the 
North and South sectional differences, but this North-South 
24 cleavage was minor in 1948. The pressure from the Ad-
ministration was sufficient in keeping the Democrats from 
splintering into bickering cliques on forei gn affairs, and 
there were few Midwestern Democrats in Congress at this time 
to follow the non1nterventionist bloc. The Sou t hern Demo-
crats supported the Administration' s foreign policies much 
more than its domestic policies, even with the Midwestern 
Republicans trying to impose a conser vative coalition wi th 
the Southerners. 
Roll call votes pertaining to forei gn aid may be 
used to emphasize the general solidarity of the South. 
These records show Democratic support never dropped lower 
than ninety percent, except for voting records in the Ei ghty-
first Senate. 25 Therefore, the Democrats had solven t ground 
24westerf1eld, Foreign Policy, p. 45. 
25Ibid. 
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on which to promote a forei gn aid plan, even within a Repub-
l _ican Congress, especially when eminent members of the Re-
publican party collaborated wi th them and when the noninter-
ventionist economy-minded bloc failed to convert the Southern 
Democrats to their side. 
BIPARTISAN FOREIGN POLICY 
In November of 1948 the citizens of the United States 
would again go to the polls. The Republicans in control of 
Congress were confident that there would be a Presidential 
victory for them and concluded, therefore, that there was 
no harm in voting bipartisanly. Also , many of them gave 
credence to the testimonies of members who had been on the 
various investigationa l committees, both those studying 
domestic realities and forei gn situations, and. judged from 
these hearing s that it would be dangerous to vote against 
the general issue of the Plan. Thereupon , most of the debate 
changed from whether leg islation should. be adopted to how 
it should be administered. 26 Evidence of t he bipartisan 
nature of the measure wa s shown when "only a fourth of the 
Republicans in the Hou s e voted against the Marshall Plan. 1127 
26summers, Economic Aid, p. 231. 
27Lubell, Revolt of the Moderates, p. 99. 
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CONTROVERSIES OVER EUROPEAN RECOVERY PROGRAM 
Former President of the United States Herbert Hoover 
warned his countrymen against ov er expenditure of the econ-
omy. This was indirect opposition 28 to the Admini stra.ti v e 
plan which called for immediate aid to Europe, and his 
cautionary remarks may have had significant repercus s ions 
in Congress to the degree of causing some members there to 
decide tha.t the forei gn a.id proposal should be altered. 
Many different forms of this hesitancy were obvious. There 
was the fear that European business methods differed from 
those in the United States, rendering comparat ive standards 
inefficient. Many Congressmen were not sure that Am erica~ 
dollar s should be used in a program t hat would show no 
dollar for dollar return. Senato Jos eph Hurst Ball of 
Minnesota was the leader of one group of twenty revisionist 
Senators who played a major part in composing the original 
draft of the legislation. 29 In addition to this, a few 
United States citizens were suspicious of European dilig ence 
28summers, Economic Aid, p. 234. Hoover's monitory 
modifications were not in complete disagreement with the 
policies of the Truman Administration inasmuch as both men 
ad.voca.ted aid to :Eu.rope, but Hoover was more concerned with 
the dangers of the Administra tive plan decorously favoring 
aid without , as he believed, observing the possibility that 
it might weaken United States economy. 
29More discussion on this element will follow in 
Chapte·r III. 
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to "put out .•. maximum effort at self-help •••. n30 'l'hen, if 
the European nations should recover, many believed, their 
economic machine would compete with the United States in-
dustrial plant, which would inflict a danger to the capi-
talistic system in the United States. Another fear was t hat 
the economies of Europe were becoming socialistic or even 
communistic. 
The foremost argument in Congress was the struggle 
over appropriati ons. Groups of Senators and Repres enta-
tives wanted the United States to utilize one or all of 
the various organizations such as the United Nations, the 
World Bank, or the International Monetary Fund in promotin g 
world recovery, while others wanted the United States to 
take complete ini ti a.ti v e in sponsoring the program but 
disagreed in the amount of money to be exp ended. The pri-
mary goal of the critical Congressmen wa s to cut the amount 
of money authorized in the passage of a f or ei gn aid bill. 
Vandenberg rea lized this fact and planned his attack accord-
ingly. He realized t ha t t h e lump fi gure of $17,000,000 , 000 , 
which the Administration's proposal would put into eff ect, 
would be a stumbling block in ultimate pa ssage.31 In order 
not to let this contention crystallize in Congress, Vandenberg 
30summers, Economic Aid, p. 231. 
31vandenberg, Private Papers, p. 385. 
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divided the total figure into annual segments subject to 
yearly debate. His leadership for the support of the 
European recovery measure reached its highest point in the 
area of appropriations. It was in this area tha t he met 
serious opposition from a Congress dedicated to balancing 
the budget, since foreign commitm ents antagonized a l a r ge 
section of the Republican party who were on the lookout f or 
dollar-cheap diplomacy without forei gn entanglement. 
Other arguments concerning the proposa l were numerous. 
Length of time for the program; debate over an administrator; 
who should control the administration of the program, Con-
gress or State Department; and aid to communist countries 
were certainly all major conflicts. Other cont entions will 
not be mentioned in this chapt er. Minor deta ils of diffi-
culties and elements of the major controv ersies over forei gn 
aid to Europe as they affected Kansas Congressmen will be 
discussed in the followi ng chapters. 
MUTUAL SECURITY ADMI NISTRATION 
In 1951, while the major question in Congress was not 
whether aid should be continu ed but rather what form the 
legislation should tak e, Congress altered the performance 
of foreign aid. The Mutual Security Act was pas sed on 
October 10, 1951, enla r g i ng the· purpose of aid to include 
military funds for the eE t ablishmen t of military strength in 
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Europe capable of posing a threat to Russia and, consequently, 
producing a defense for the United States. The meaning of 
the Marshall Plan was no longer entirely economic; in fact, 
that purpose seems to have been lo s t in favor of European 
military security. However, it is difficult to separ a te 
economic from military aid for the reason tha t economic aid 
to a country will likely promote a stronger military machine 
in tha t country also, and. this writer will make few a ttempts 
at this sepa ration. 
The Mutua l Security Act of 1951 not only shifted the 
emphasis of aid from peacetime recov ery to military defense 
but also pla ced. the progr am under t he authority of a single 
agency, the Mutual Security Ag ency h eaded by the Director 
for Mutual Security, largely because of the distrust b etwe en 
Congress and the State Department. 32 
32Many of the disputes evident in The Marshall Plan 
debate continued in existence during the debates over passage 
of the Mutual Security Act. 
CHAPTER III 
SENATORS 
Five different men served as Senators from Kansas 
during the years between 1947 and 1959. All were closely 
associated with agricultural matters, but only four were 
active in matters treating with foreign relations. 
Senator Harry Darby, a replacement for Senator Clyde 
Martin Reed, who died on November 8, 1949, was never active 
in any particular area of Congressional business due to the 
shortness of his term in office as the a.ppointed member to 
conclude the term of Reed. Darby's opinions and influence 
cannot be adequate ly discussed in this study as his attitude 
toward foreign aid was not published. It can be noted, 
however, that amendments reduc ing the total appropriations 
for the administration of the 1950 ECA were accepted by 
Darby even though these amendments were generally rejected 
in the Senate. He was also alarmed ov er conditions indicating 
socialization of European industry and ove,r European coun-
tries, who aided through ECA funds, seemed to be discrimi -
nating against American business interests. Official business 
detained Darby on May 5, 1950, the day of the Senate vote on 
the ECA bill of that year. 1 However~ with the limited amount 
1congressional Record, 81 Cong., 2 Sess. (Washington: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1 950), p. 6442. 
Hereinafter cited as Congressional Record. 
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of information available, it is concluded by this writer that 
Darby was in favor of t he lowest possibl e appropriation 
with regard to forei gn aid. 
The other four Senators r eviewed in this chapter were 
more active in foreign affairs t han was Darby. Senator 
Arthur Capper, a long-standing member of the Senate, was a 
member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator 
Andrew Frank Schoeppel replaced Capper after the latter's 
retirement in 1949; the maneuver of retiring Capper supposedly 
was viewed with approbation by the Kansas Republican organi -
zation, if not initiated by them to make room for the younger 
Schoeppel. Schoeppel was to become a member of the Appropri-
ations Committee, and important committee in conjunction 
with foreign aid spending. 
Frank Carlson became a Kansas Senator in 1951, sitting 
in the seat which Darby had filled for one year, 1950. 
Carlson and Schoeppel remained in the Senate up to and beyond 
1959. 
The followi ng discussion will be a presenta tion of the 
individual opinions of Kansas Senators Capper, Reed, Schoeppel, 
and Carlson. Because of the paucity of information no fur-
thur statements can be made re.garding Darby. 
SENATOR CAPPER 
Senator Arthur Capper, Republican of Kansas, viewed 
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the Greek-Turkish aid proposal of 1947 with uncertainty. 
Aid to Greece and Turkey, he believed, would mean ultimate 
aid to other countries around the world whose people were 
threatened by communist infiltration. He wanted to know 
2 where the end would be to European aid. The spread of such 
commitmen ts over the world, in Capper's viewpoint, would 
probably not be known by all the citizens of the United 
States unless each measure was brought to the surface through 
Congressional debate. Capper seemed to fear that the Depart-
ment of State would erect a veil of secrecy around the 
United States foreign policy. Capper also seemed fearful 
that such a program would bring an unhealthy i ncrease in 
executive power. On J anuary 5, 1948, Capper made these 
remarks over radio station WI BW of Topeka, Kansas: 
Aid 
••• I cannot see why, just because we won a war , we 
have to lose the peace by adopting the political and 
economic philosophies and practices of those whom we 
defeated in the war. 
I decline to accept even the theory that the price 
we must pay for the Marshall plan ••• must be the sur-
render of the freedom of America to the, rule of the 
totalitarian State. 
Personally, I do not see that we have to pay that 
price (Truman asking emergency power on November 17, 
1947] in order to contribute [sixteen to twenty ::J 
billion dollars worth of food , fuel, fertilizer, and 
capital goods to Europe in the coming five years. If 
it should develop that we do have to pay tha t price--
surrender of individual freedom to Sta~e controls--
then I repeat, the price is too great. 
2congressional Record, 80 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 1241-42. 
3t•car.per Says Should Not Give Up American Freedom to 
Europe,' Topeka Daily Capital, January 5, 1948, p. 4. 
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He commented that he must be shown the necessity for 
expending billions of dollars on the European recovery pro-
gram. However, Capper seemed to believe that Congress was 
bound in its actions by commitments in Europe made by the 
Democratic Administration. After March, 1948, his stand 
against foreign aid was replaced by a more positive belief 
toward economic aid measure~ based primarily on the under-
standing that American money must be spent to reconstruct 
Europe because of the commitments made to Europe. 4 He saw 
no alternative to the Marshall Plan since he viewed the plan 
as being one of distribution of foodstuffs to the hungry 
peoples of Europe, rehabilitation of indu s try and agriculture, 
and a device to allow European countries to main t a in their 
freedom. Capper still maintained reservations about the 
potentiality of increased Government control, as he stated: 
••• the Government will have to supervise, control, 
allocate and select, what goods are sent out and what 
goods are allowed in, both as to those financed by 
government (about $50,000,000,000 in the next five or 
six years starting from 1948] , and those financed thru 
trade channels. 
The whole forei gn trade picture, government-financ ed 
exports, privately-financed exports, and all imports, 
will have to be co-ordinated. If not there will be 
endless confusion, free competition among both exporters 
and importers. 
So, as you see, one effect of the European Recovery 
Progra~ will be to force a government-controlled foreign 
trade. 
4Topeka Daily Capital, March 8, 1948, p. 1 • . 
511 European Recovery Plan to Boost U.S. Exports P.Y 
Billions, but Costs Must Come From American Taxpayers, 
Topeka Daily Capital, March 1, 1948, p. 4. 
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The part of the recover y program which Capper liked 
best was the provision whereby farm commodities were selected 
by the Commodity Credit Corporation and sold through regu-
lar channels to the European governments thus providing 
food for the European economic recovery plan. This would 
establish an outlet for surplus agricultural products by 
means of adopting fair-price regulatory devices which would 
benefit the farmers of the United States by keeping prices 
high and stimulating the production of needed commodities 
to feed a hungry world. 
Senator Capper 's position as a member of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee during the years examined in this 
study make his opinions of particular interest . Although 
Capper was senior member serving on the commi ttee , his 
poor health resulted in Vandenberg's appointment as Chair-
man. Capper and Vandenberg seemed to work in conjunction 
with each other during the later years of thei r careers in 
Congress. During the Marshall Plan deba te in the Foreign 
Relations Committee as well as in the Senate , Vandenberg 
played the l eading role while Capper followed the main i s su es 
outlined by Vandenberg, not only on Marshall Plan legi s -
6 lation but in other areas as well. Capper made this 
6r.etter from Homer E. Socolofsky to Darrell Munsell 
dated February 13, 1960. Homer Socolofsky, Professor of 
History at Kansas State University, has conducted a study on 
Senator Capper's political career. His conclusions also con-
firm the closeness of thought between Capper and Vandenberg. 
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statement in 1948 concerning Vandenberg: 
Thanks to the effective leadership of Senator Vandenberg 
••• I would not be surprised if the Senate passes the bill 
[European recovery plan] by the middle of February. 7 
Capper and the other members of the Foreign Relations 
Committee following the advice of Vandenberg, approved the 
Marshall proposal in the committee, and continued to agitate 
for its passage in the Senate. Thorny items requiring approval 
in the committee included such particulars as (1) how much 
aid should be authorized and (2) who should direct the 
administration of the program. Capper could see no reason 
for "pollyfoxing" on the latter question in either the 
committee or in the Senate debate. 8 
The Senate Committee unanimously agreed on February 12, 
1948, that the sixteen countries designated to receive the 
aid must carry out a progr am of self-help whereby they would 
assist in their own recovery. Another unanimous deciston 
by the Foreign Relations Committee authorized $5,300,000,000 
to be spent for the Marshall proposal over the first year 
9 beginning April 1, 1948. 
7 11 cap:r.er Says Foreign Aid Bill May Be Passed by Middle 
of February, 1 Topeka Daily Capital, January 12, 1948, p. 4. 
811 capper in Senate Fight to Stay--Pleased With Public 
Response, 11 Topeka Daily Capital, January 26, 1948, p. 4. 
9"senate Group To Polish Up New Aid Bill," Topeka 
Daily Capital, February 15, 1948, p. 1. The Administration 
had asked for $6,800,000,000 for the first fifteen months. 
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In a radio speech over station WIBW on March 7, 1948, 
Capper commented on the Marshall Plan by saying: 
As for myself, I do not see that anything is going 
to be gained by carrying on the debate in Congress over 
the Marshall Plan legislation. 
The European Recovery Program ••• as worked out thru 
the masterly leadership of Sena tor Vandenberg ••• in the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee , came from that 
committee with unanimous support from the Committee •••• 
Under these circumstances, I can see no object in any 
prolonged debate. 
The House of Representativ e s also will hav e to pass 
the bill. And I think the sooner both branches of 
Congress act, the better.lo 
The Senate voted down the am endment proposed by Senator 
Glen Hearst Taylor, which designated the administration of 
the European Recovery Program by means of the United Nation s, 
on March 15, 1948. Both Senators Capper and Reed voted. 
against the amendment; Capper seemed to believe that t he 
United Nat i ons Relief and Rehabilitation Administration had 
been a failure in giving adequate relief to Europe and that 
11 the amendment would simply invite another such failure . 
He also believed that economic and military backing for Europe 
would not be sufficient to remedy the unstable world condi-
tion. He added the Middle East and the Far East, includ i ng 
Korea, Manchuria, and China as areas that would be needing aid. 
Capper, even with the fear of continuing inflation and 
10,, car.per Predicts Senate Will Pass Marshall Plan Bill, 
Few Changes, Topeka Daily Capital, March 8, 1948, p. 4. 
ll 11 capper Tells of Growing Talk About Possibility of 
Another World War--and. Effects on Congressional Acts," Topeka 
Daily Capital, March 15, 1948, p. 4. 
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high taxes, supported the Marshall Plan with what seemed to 
be wholehearted approval. 12 He had previously voted against 
amendments limiting appropriations, such as the Taft Amend-
ment, as well as voting against all amendments altering the 
proposal as passed by the Foreign Relations Committee. 
In Au gust of 1948, Capper stated: 
Since 1941, as a member of the Foreign Relations 
Committee and in my votes on the floor of the Senate, 
I have gone along, have supported in the main, the 
bipartisan forei gn policy which we decided held the best 
prospects for a peaceful postwar world, and. for the 
future prosperity and happiness and securl ty of the 
peopl e of the United States. I supported the United 
Nations Charter, the British loan, Bretton Woods, 
Greek-Turkish aid, the Marshall program, approv i ng the 
principle in general that we could well afford to take 
the calculated risks involved in the interest of a better 
and safer world. 
The most of these progr ams have been based on the 
United States giving much and taking little--aside 
from the calculated risks involved. I am not criticiz-
ing that at all. As I say, I went along, and am not 
voicing any regrets that I did so .13 
Senator Capper ended his long thirty-year career in 
the Senate in 1948. He remained connect ed with political 
life in Wa sh ington, however, and offered weekly statements 
to the Topeka Daily Capital until his death on December 19, 
1951. He left the Senate in complete support of foreign 
aid, but his attitude during his retirement seems to shift 
to a critical view of the matter. He became suspicious of 
high governmental spending. After 1948 he seemed to see 
1 2capper's vote may be found in the Congressional 
Record, 80 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 2793. 
13congressiona,l Record, 80 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 9595. 
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a grandiose Truman plan of prolonged inflation providing 
a false economy in the United States. The proponents of 
foreign aid spending , Capper believed, based their case on 
the idea that the plan provided a continuing market for 
agricultura l prodt1 cts and a continuing market for American 
industrial products entailing a larg e working force in the 
United Sta tes; but the proponents did not, in Capper's 
opinion, mention that the Government collected taxes from 
the American citizens. To him, the Government collected 
money from the Amari can people, with one hand and gave it 
away to foreign nations with the other hand. No United 
States citizen could prosper under such a situa tion, at 
least not the average American wag e earner. 14 
The continuing spiral of a rising infla tion seemed to 
Capper to be a larger threat to the people of t h e United 
States than the Russian menace. Inflation would produce a 
11Welfare State" like England, especially if President 
Truman's program was g iven a mandate from the people. 15 
SENATOR REED 
Twenty Republican Senators met at the apartment house 
1411 How Long Can U.S. Supply World With Goods and 
Dollars to Buy Them," Topeka Daily Capital, February 10, 
1949, p. 4. 
1511 seek Aid Harmony," Kansas City Star, February 31, 
1948, p. 1. 
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of Senator Clyde Martin Reed of Kansas in continuous and 
priva.t.e meetings throughout the months of January and. Feb-
ruary to discuss possible revision s applicable to the 
Marshall proposal. Most of these twenty Senators were from 
the Mid-West with Senators Jos eph Hurst Ball of Minnesota 
and Kenneth Spicer Wherry of Nebraska being leaders of this 
group. This powerful group, none of them members of the 
Foreign Relations Committee, presented a bloc somewhere 
between the Taft and Vandenberg Senate cleavage . The group 
of twenty Senators were primarily interested in reducing 
the proposed fi gure of $6,800,000,000 for the Marshall Plan. 
A conference meeting was arranged between a commit t ee from 
the twenty Senators and Vandenberg to discuss the proposals 
offered by the group of twenty. This meeting was held at 
Reed's apartment on February 7, 1948. 16 The ess enc e of the 
changes proposed by this group to the Marshall propo sa l were 
as follows: (1) compel the sixteen Marshall Plan countries 
to submit specific recov ery projects to the United States 
Administrator who would either accept or reject them; ( 2) 
hold back aid to countries who used the aid money for 
socialization of their industry; (3) give the power to an 
Administrator responsible to Congress and not the Sta te 
Department; (4) condition aid to England on the basis of 
l6 11 seek Aid Harmony," Kansas City Star, February 31, 
1948, p. 1. 
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British coal exports to the continent; and (5) lower the 
total appropriations. 17 
The revisions to the Marshall proposal placed Vandenberg 
in a difficult position. Advocating a full authorization of 
$6,800,000,000, even though he desired this, might cause a 
split in the Republican Party. 18 Vandenberg desired to recon-
cile as many of the party differences as possible on the 
proposal before the Foreign Relations Committee prepared a 
draft of the plan. He was thus willing to work out a com-
promise with the powerful bloc of the t wenty Republican Sen-
ators. He followed the meetings of this group quite care-
fully, keeping in mind that an ''all-or-nothing" Truman pro-
gram would encounter severe difficulties in the Senate because 
it would likely cause alienati on of this revisionist bloc. 19 
17"consider Major Alterations in Foreign Aid Setup," 
Emporia Gazette, January 31, 1948, p. 1. 
l8 11Maneuver on Aid," Kansas City Star, February 3, 
1948, p. 5. A letter from Senator Reed published in the 
Topeka Daily Capital on February 11, 1948, to a Wichita, 
Kansas attorney rela ted the objectives of the group of 
twenty Sena.tors. Reed sta ted in this letter: "We have a 
great responsibility, not only for our own freedom, but for 
the freedom of all people. I do not think we should fail that 
responsibility •••• The group of [twenty] Senators who have been 
meeting in my home are trying to look with candor at the pic-
ture, obtain all the facts that are available; deal intelli-
gently with both the political and economic phases; insiat 
upon better and intellig ent administration; more ca.re in 
d.eterrnining the amounts of money necessary, and how and where 
II that money should be• used. We have made some headway •••• 
19Kansas City Star, February 8, 1948, p. 5A. 
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Some of the members of this group, composing almost 
one-fifth of the members of the Senate, were out to destroy 
the program. 20 Howev er, the ma jority of thi s group only 
wanted to make special recomme ndation s to Vandenb er g and t he 
Foreign Relations Committee, with the chief sugge s tion being 
a lower figure in the amount of aid appropria t ed for t he pro-
gram. Some of t h e group's revisions tha t Vandenberg compro-
mised with or accepted were: (1) t h e authorization for t h e 
four and one half years would be gr anted from year to year, 
not in one general appropriation of $17,000,000,000; (2) 
self-help obligations of European countri es woul d be 
strengthened by stressing continui t y of cooper ation among 
countries involved; and (3) an Administra tor wou l d be 
established. 21 
20Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr. (ed.), The Priv a te Papers 
of Senator Vandenberp; (Boston: Houghton Mi fflin Company, 1952), 
pp. 384-85. 
21Ibid. His vote on March 12, 1948 , agai ns t t he Taft 
Amendm ent to cut the a ppropriation s from $5,300,000,000 to 
$4,000,000,000 for the first phase of the Marshall legi sl a t i on , 
was supported by his statement in t h e Congr essi onal Record, 
80 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 2720-21: "I voted against the Taft 
amendment •••• ! do not want it to b e understood tha t t hat 
means I am going to vote against the bill. I expect to vot e 
for the bill. I do not want it under stood tha t tha t fore-
closes me as to the amount of money involved. I voted against 
the Taft amendment because I thought the authorization should 
be at least a limit which would make for flexibility in the 
handling of appropriations and the funds to be appropriated 
from this time on. 
"I am a memb er of the Committee on Appropriations, and 
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The revisionist bloc wanted to keep harmony within 
the Republican Party, and the majority of these twenty mem-
bers realized a dangerous condition was present when the 
Marshall Plan was too severely attacked. The Republican 
Party might split into distinct lines whereby one side would 
follow Vandenberg and the other join Taft in the race for the 
1948 Presidential nomination. This could conceivably hurt 
the Republican chances in the 1948 elections. Reed expressed 
this fear in a letter to Sena tor Ball published February 26 , 
1948. He stated: 
I profoundly believe tha t the U.S. has a tremendous 
responsibility in the present world situa tion which it 
cannot safely i gnore. Any serious attmpt [sic.] to 
ignore our responsibility might break the Republican 
Party in two--at least create a serious break. 22 
In the same letter Reed expressed his opinion on how 
the bill should be written: 
I think the bill should be so written as to allow 
consideration in two parts: 
l. The diploma.tic move should clearly be under the 
State Department even tho the State Department has 
not crowned itself with glory. The President operates 
in international relati ons thru the State Department 
and we probably couldn't change tha t if we wanted to. 
in that committee I shall subject the amount to be appropri-
ated to the closest scrutiny of which I am capable .••• We have 
[those who voted against the Taft Amendment] publicly stated 
that we favor the lowest sum that can be reasonably appropri-
ated to do the job •••• 
"I hope to be able conscientiously and fairly to vote 
for a smaller sum than $5,300,000,000, but I wan t a record 
before the Appropriations Committee which will justify such 
a vote." 
22"Reed Outlines Idea To Prevent Split on Marshal l 
Plan," Topeka Daily Capital, January 27, 1948, p. 12. 
39 
However, the power and authority of the State Department 
in the development of the forei gn program which we call 
the Marshall plan, should be severely limited. 
2. When it come s to utilizing the money we are asked 
to appropriate for rehabilitation of their European 
industrial and agricultural economy, certainly the State 
Department should be on the sidelines, if around at all. 
A strong competent organization of industrialists and 
scientists should be set up. We h ave the "know how" in 
this count.ry to a pre-eminent degree. We should ap~ly our 
11 know how" thru competent engineers and scientists. 3 
Senator Reed desired to keep the Republican Party 
intact, and with this desire, he g enerally voted the Vandenberg 
line. 24 In order to vote as Vandenberg proposed, Reed voted 
against the Taft .Amendment for a lower appropriation. On 
the other hand he momentarily deserted Vandenberg by voting 
in favor of the Ball Amendment of 1 948 which provided 
measures to stabilize European currency and establish a 
valid rate of exchang e between countries. Reed joined 
eleven Senators in proposing an amendment to a ppoint an Agent 
General for Economic Cooperation under the control of the 
Senate as a means of coordinating the activities of the 
Administration's mission and those of Congress. Later Reed 
reversed his thinking after Vandenberg attacked the program 
in the Senate debate and voted against the proposed amend-
ment. This points to the fact that Reed deserted his 
colleagues whenever Vandenberg strongly protested the proposal 
23Ib1d. 
24His vote on the Marshall Plan may be found 1n the 
Con5ressional Record, 80 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 2793. 
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being voted upon. 25 
His vote in favor of the Marshall Plan was naturally 
connected with his interest in agriculture. He believed t h e 
Commodity Credit Corporation should send surplus commodities 
to Europe with reimbursement for these commodities to come 
from the Government's appropriations to the Economic Coopera-
tion Administra tion. 26 Another change in the 1949 bill on 
European aid which passed the Senate and was supported by 
Reed was the provision appropriating aid to Spain. Reed 
continued to support the aid program in 1949 with the addi -
tions mentioned above. 27 His 1949 vote was his last vote on 
foreign aid. owing to his death on November 8, 1949. 
SENATOR SCHOEPPEL 
When Senator Schoeppel took office in 1949 he dis-
agreed with many of the activities promoted by Marshall Plan 
money. He opposed such things as allowing England to pur-
chase wheat from Canada with Marshall Plan money , which, in 
the free market, discriminated against American wheat; England 
25rbid., p. 2536. This citation is an example of Reed's 
vote against an amendment proposed by the lis t of Senators 
who invited Reed as· a colleague . Reed's vote aga inst this 
amendment is an indica tion that Reed supported the main items 
that Vandenberg favored. 
26congressional Record, 81 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 3857. 
27His vote in 1949 may be found in the Congressional 
Record, 81 Cong., l Sess., p. 4147. 
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sending war materials to Russia; and, in general, as 
Schoeppel believed, Dean Acheson's policy of pleasing the 
11R d II es instead of promulgating a policy of strictness 
against the communist countries. He was in favor of a 
gradual withdrawal from Asia for the reason that the United 
States was misunderstood in that area and that no action on 
the pa.rt of the United States would d estroy that misund er-
standing. The Crises-Government, the Truman Administration, 
was making sincere inte.rnationalists out of many of the 
citizens in the United States, said Schoeppel, and t h e inter-
nationalists were the group who seemed to lead the nation 
toward the horrors of war. In Schoeppel's thinking , the 
United States must withdraw from world. affairs i n to a hard 
shell of American continential concerns protected by mill tary 
installations in the United Sta tes alone. 28 
Schoeppel also believed that the a.mounts pa i d out by 
the United States to t h e United Nations, World Health Organi-
zation, and military and economic development overseas were 
too large when compared to the amounts expended in t he United 
States to feed and rehabilitate the hungry and jobless and to 
promote projects such as flood-relief. As far as he was con-
cerned, he was going to "chart his course 11 for a strong 
America by voting for the military requiremen ts within the 
28congressional Record, 81 Cong ., 2 Sess., p. A7553. 
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United States and only those projects abroad which he con-
sidered necessary as a way of strengthening the United States 
military force in its line of defense for the Western 
Hemisphere. 29 
Throughout the Truman administration, Schoeppel voted 
against foreign aid in the form of the Marshall Plan as well 
as the Mutual Security Administration. He voted for amend-
ments to lower the appropriations and amendments to curtail 
aid to countries trading with communist countries. His only 
favorable thought in connection with foreign aid was concerned 
with the exchange of United States surplus agricultural 
commodities. In 1953 he introduced a bill authorizing the 
Commodity Credit Corporation to transfer certain surplus 
agricultural commodities to the Director of Mutual Security 
for sale to countries participating in the mutual security 
program. 30 These surplus agricultural prod.uc ts would be 
exchanged for foreign currencies, which, in turn, would be 
used to reinforce the Mutual Security .Administration as loans 
to banking institutions in cooperat ing countries, or to pay 
United States obligations for economic development, or for 
cooperative defense establishments throughout the world. 
In arguing for such a program, Schoeppel believed that the 
29 11 Truma.n Message Called 'Pie-In-Sky I Poli tics, 11 
Topeka. Daily Capital, January 10, 1952, p. 1. 
30congressional Record, 83 Cong., 1 Sass., pp. 6li-25-26. 
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local currencies would save American dollars wh i le still 
strengthening the defenses of Western Europe. The United 
States could a.lso obtain strategic materials from these 
countries as a result of the above exchang e plan. This bill 
(S. 2127) was never voted on in 1953 because other legis-
lation similar to this bill was passed in the House. 
To make his position clear relative to the Mutual 
Security Administration, Schoeppel stated in 1953 that 
I have listened to the discussion about this being an 
authorization measure. Frankly, I want to say my position 
••• would be one of serious doubt, if I felt that the 
amount of money authorized by t his bill would have to 
be appropriated •••• I think it is sound to expect that the 
Appropriations Committee, when these authorizations come 
before it, will go over them with a fine-toothed comb, 
and will cut out many of the expenditures which can jus-
tifiably be eliminated. I would not think of vot i ng 
for this bill as an authorization of the whole
3
!mount, 
if I did not feel that that was the situation. 
Schoeppel, in the above explanation, c oncluded that 
there must be a reduction in the 1953 Mutual Security appro-
priations before he would vote in favor of it, and he stated 
in the same messag e that he would vote for a ll such reductions 
as reduction in the amount of appropriations was the desired 
end. Another example of his r egard for lowering the total 
amount of appropriations may be found in his 1956 voting 
record which clearly shows tha t he voted in favor of enacting 
mutual assistance but voted against the bill which appropriated 
3lrbid., p. 7793. 
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money to implement it. The interpretation of h is 1956 
voting record shows that he was in f avor of a mutual assis-
tance agency but wa.s in disagreement with the total fi gure 
Congress would authorize for such an agency. In 1957 
Schoeppel again voted for the bill which enacted the Mutual 
Security Administrat ion. In t his year, however, his voting 
record shows a distinct approval for military aid for Europe , 
which was nev er c ertain in the preceding yea rs, but he main-
' tained again tha t the fi gure, as originally set in the bill, 
was too high. 32 The amount of aid finally arrived at £or 
military purposes in the 1957 forei gn aid bill was satis-
factory enough for Schoeppel to give his approving vote for 
the entire Mutual Security bill. This vote in favor was not 
necessarily a change-over fo r Schoeppel. Some political 
pressure was being put on him to vote for forei gn aid measures, 
especially in 1957 when it was evident t hat the people of 
Kansas were hi g_½ly in favor of the Eisenhower .Admini stra.tion. 33 
32Toe figure for the Mutual Security bill of 1957 was 
orig inally $1,800,000,000. Schoeppel voted against the amend-
ment proposed by Senator Allen Joseph Ellender to reduc e the 
figure to $1,300,000,000, but he voted in favor of reducing 
the figure to #1,700,000,000, which was offered by Senator 
Russell Billiu Long in an amendment that was defeated in the 
Senate. Congressional Record, 85 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 9126-
28. 
33schoeppel had been up for reelection in 1954, a 
starting a.ate for his growing support of Eisenhower policies. 
An article by James L. McConaugh?i, Jr., "While Eisenhower 
Proposes The Old Guard Disposes, 1 Life, June 21, 1954, p. 133, 
acknowledges the pressure put upon Schoeppel to support the 
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His attitude relative to aiding underdeveloped countries 
remained the same during these years even if his view con-
cerning military aid to Europe shifted. In 1959 Schoepp el 
made the following statement regarding the economic develop-
ment of countries: 
It amazes me that responsible economists have so 
completely misread the history of American economic 
development which should provide a basis for sound 
progress in other underdeveloped countries today. One 
hundred. and fifty years ago the United States was cer-
tainly underde·veloped and our present position in the 
world was not secured throulh grants from a multitude 
of international agencies.3 
Later, in the same speech he stated: 
••• in considering proposals for economic aid we must 
make sure that recipient countries can benefit from our 
own experience. Those who in other nations wish to enjoy 
the amenities which hard work has achieved for Americans 
must emulate some of the methods we have adopted r a ther 
than to expect that the ·American taxpayer will continue 
to transfer the wealth he has created to other nation s 
through international agencies. 
I have long supported the thesi_s that military assis-
tance to countries who wish to resist the deadly virus of 
Communist totalitarianism is in the interests of all our 
people. On the othe r hand, I cannot agr ee to the propo-
sition that we should support any progr am which guarantees 
programs of the President who is popular in Kansas. However, 
Schoeppel is still considered as an "Old Guard" Republican 
in that he does not support basic Eisenhower legislation, such 
as foreign aid or general forei gn policy. His non-support of 
foreign aid measures is more in the area of appropriations 
than in the actual body of security programs, but his disin-
cl1nation to vote appropriation approvals, in itself, devoids 
his vote for mutual security enactments. 
34con5ressional Record, 86 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 11743. 
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full employment in New Delhi, Rangoon, Paris, and Rome 
if it also promises unemployment and bread lines in 
Topeka and Wichita .3~ 
He disliked the thought that the United States was 
pouring money into countries tha t were not allies and who 
attacked the forei gn policy of the United States; or countries 
that would require billions and billions to turn them selves 
from "poverty-stricken, disease-ridden, agricultural countries 
like India into modern industrial nations. 11 36 
As an answer to the popular contention that aid from 
the United States actually was a profit to American industry, 
Schoeppel stated: 
As I view the trends in the American agricultural 
situation, the textile industry, the lumbering industry, 
the steel industry, the automobile industry, the mining 
industry and a host of other vital segments of our 
economy, I am becoming more and more convinced that 
unless an end is put to this wasteful mismanaged, scoop-
shovel, give-away forei gn aid program, we will
3
~ave 
serious economic dislocations in this country. 
He believed the United States failed in its foreign 
aid program because the American people expected t h is aid to 
do something that was impossible for it to accomplish; to 
promote freedom and security throughout the world. 
Again in 1958 and in 1959, as in the years prior to 
1956, Schoeppel voted "nay" for the continuation of a mutual 
35Ibid., p. 11747. 
36congressional Record, 85 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 19426. 
37rbid., p. 19427. 
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security program. In 1959 he was one of the eight Republicans 
who joined with ei ghteen Democrats in voting against the 
measure.38 The main reasons he listed for voting against the 
legislation in 1959 were: 
Upon examination of the foreign aid program , it was 
my conclusion that the purposes for which it had b een 
originally established had largely been accomplished. 
Almost every European country has a "gross national 
product" several hundred percent higher than pre-World 
War II levels. That was the primary purpose for estab-
lishing this program. That objective was achieved years 
ago. The United States must assume its obli gation s to 
the free world, but in my opinion, the Americ an taxpay er 
is also entitl ed to some protection.39 
SENATOR CARLSON 
Senator Frank Carlson believed the United States could 
not barricade itself within America away from the world 
problems nor spread itself too thinly throughout the world 
by means of unwise foreign-aid spending . In 1951 he wanted 
to terminate the orig inal form of Marshall Plan spsnding by 
replacing EGA spending with a plan whereby the military would 
receive all the funds formerly granted to the EGA. Thi s 
would be enacted after an understanding had been rea ched with 
military heads that the use of these funds would be for the 
building of factories and defense installations. 40 The 
3~ewsletter from Andrew F. Schoeppel dated July, 1959. 
39rbid. 
40con~ressional Record, 82 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 10878. 
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amount of funds sent to Europe should be lowered however, 
Carlson believed, in tha.t it was necessary to lower govern-
mental expenditures if the Government was ever going to 
balance its budget. The Government must cut-back on all 
expenditures, tighten its belt in all areas of spending, mak e 
its sacrifices in the United States as well as all over the 
world. He states t h is belief as follows: 
Further substantial savings, possibly totaling 
$1,500,000,000, should be made in forei gn aid, both 
military and economic. I realize the importance of 
forei gn aid to help the free world present a strong and 
united front to the forces of Communist aggression. 
Nevertheless, since we are calling for sacrifices and 
belt-tightening by American citizens and urging our 
people to get along on less, in all justice we must do 
the same thing i n the countries we are helping . In 
short, the principles of equal sacrifice for all Ameri cans 
must be expanded, when it comes to our foreign-aid pro-
grams, to ~£-ual sacrific e for all tho se fi ghting 
Communism. 
Nonetheless, even with his ag itation for Congress to 
put a stop to increased budgets and increasing taxes, his 
first vote as a Senator on forei gn aid in 1951 wa s 11 yea. 11 
In a speech at Colgate Unive r sity on July 14, 1954, 
Carlson numbered the choices wh ich t h e Government had to 
settle the farm surpluses . These solutions were: (1) limit 
production; (2) spend Government funds for storage; (3) give 
the surplus commodities away; or (4) help foreign countries 
to earn the needed money to buy these surpluses. 42 Carlson 
41Ibid., p. 4667. 
42ncarlson Backs U.S. Foreign Trade Plan, 11 Topeka 
Daily Capital, July 16, 1954, p. 6. 
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advocated that the foreign policy of the United States be 
based on a realistic approach which would. utilize the agri-
cultural surpluses as a tool of foreign policy. A policy of 
more trade, less economic aid, and some military aid were 
the points on which Carlson would base a forei gn policy of 
the United States. He foresaw, however, tha t maintaining 
and increasing agricultural markets abroad meant clash i n g 
with the agricultural productivity of Canada. An answer to 
this problem, argued Carls on , was a provision propos ed by 
Senator John Little McClellan of Arkansa s in his 1953 amend-
ment to the Mutual Security bill of tha t year. Th i s amend-
ment would use a currency-conversion progr am whereby the 
United States would accept foreign currency in indirect pay-
ment for surplus agricultural commoditi e s produc ed in the 
United States. This would aid t h e United Sta t es in mee ting 
the competition offered by Canada. The foreign currency 
would be spent by the United States in the count ry from 
which it came for military supplies and s erv i ces. 43 
The need for a program for dis posing of whea t surpluses 
was stressed in a speech by Carlson b efore the St a te Boa rd 
43congressional Record, 83 Cong ., 1 Sess., p. 7774. 
The amendment was agreed to by a vote of forty-nine to 
II II thirty-five. Carlson, along with Schoeppel, voted nay 
on the McClellan Amendment apparently because it would grant 
extended authority to the Mutual Security Administration, not 
because they disagreed with the general plans of d isposing 
surplus agricultural commoditi e s in the amendment by the means 
of accepting foreign currency. 
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of Agriculture at Topeka, Kansas, on January 15, 1953. He 
stated: 
There have been times in the past when a carry-over 
of that size [550,000,000 bushels of wheat] was one of 
the hallmarks of a depression among wheat farmers. 
Today this surplus wheat and other surplus food com-
modities enter into the international picture as a part 
of our defense program. It is as vital for the future 
peace of the world, and probably more so, than munitions 
of war. 44 
Carlson was in favor of sending surplus agricultural 
products to Europe, but he was not in favor of the United 
States Government giving thes e food commodities as g ifts. 
His plan would permit private concerns, such as the Christian 
Rural Overseas Program, to purchase these commodities from 
the Commodity Credit Corporation. The commoditi es would 
then be sent as gifts from these private organization s. All 
aid. to the smaller countries of the world, Carlson believed, 
should not be terminated in toto. Instead the Executive 
Department of the United States should stand ready"to heed 
their pleas if aggression occurs," helping them both eco-
nomically and militarily whenever acts of aggression threatens 
them. 45 Through his evaluation of foreign aid spending by 
the United States under the Eisenhower Administration in 
44rbid., p. Al95. 
45congressional Record, 85 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 1419. 
President Eisenhower reque s ted such a plan be enacted by 
Congress which would allow him this power of assisting sma.11 
countries faced with i mmediate agression. 
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1956, Carlson concluded: 
I do not mean to infer t hat you should. b e precluded 
from making expenditures abroad for rea. l and genui ne 
national defens e , but I fail to s ee , and I cannot condone, 
this apparently endless demand for forei gn spending on 
projects tha t have little or no rela tionshi p to our 
national defense. 
I do not deny tha t many countries need mi litary aid 
and technical assi s tanc e in meeting probl ems of hunger , 
disease, military defens e . But we hav e segments in our 
national economy tha t are also i n need of serious con-
sideration a t this time.46 
Senator Carlson became a memb er of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Commi t tee i n 1959. He commended Senator J ames 
Franklin Fulbright, Cha irman of the Committee, for hi s for-
bearance in assisting him in the foreign affairs area. 
Carlson also joined Fulbright in praising t he 1959 mutual 
Security legislati on for the ma. in reason t ha t this assistance 
bill provided for a gradual chang e from a gran t program to 
a loan program. Believing this 1959 mutual security bill was 
the best measure brought before t he Senate s ince he had 
become a member of tha t body, Carlson acted for its passage . 
He also supported the Fulbright proposal for a five-year 
progr am in connection with the Developmen t Loan Fund as a 
part of mutual security l egi slation. 47 
Carlson supported, by vot e , mutual security leg islation 
throughout t he years of 1952 to 1959, but remained suspicious 
of l ar g e aid programs during this period. 
46con5ressional Record, 84 Cong ., 1 Sess., p. 2156. 
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The Kansas members of the House of Representatives 
manifested more conservatism than the two Kansas Senators. 
Of the six Republican representatives from the sta te, two 
voted against t he 1948 aid plan while both Sena tor s voted in 
favor of it. These two men, Representative Wint Smith from 
the Sixth Congressional District and Representative Edward 
Herbert Rees from the Fourth Congres s ional District, were 
among the 11hard core 11 of the isola tionist bloc in the House, 
although neither were ostensibly active in the mov ement ; both 
wrote and made brief statements concerning their viewpo ints, 
but their battle in Congress does not compare with the 
fev erish debates of other Representatives dedicated to economy. 
Only two of the six members in the House of Represen-
tatives from Kansas during 1948 remained in the House 
throughout this entire period, 1948 to 1959. The four mem-
bers who did not remain in Congress were replaced by reason 
of their death, retirement, or by the ir los s in various 
elections. Representa tive Herbert Alton Mey er of t he Third 
Congressio·nal District died on October 2, 1950, and was 
replaced by Republican Myron V. George on November 7, 1950, 
who finished out the term and was re-elected until Democrat 
Denver David Hargis replaced him in 1958; Clifford Ragsdale 
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Hope, Representative from the Fifth Congres sional District, 
retired after the 1956 session of Congress, and was replaced 
by Democrat James Floyd Breeding in the election of that 
same year; Albert McDonald Cole was defeated in 1952 by 
Democrat Howard S. Miller in the election for the First 
Congressional seat, and Miller, in turn, after one term, was 
defeated by Republican William Henry Avery in 1954; and in 
the Second Congressional District, Errett Power Scrivner was 
defeated by Democrat Newell A. Georg e in t h e 1958 election. 
The discussion in this chapter is a presentation of the 
attitudes on forei gn aid to Europe existing among the Kansas 
Representati½es. 
REPRESENTATIVE COLE 
Representative Albert McDonald Cole from t he First 
Congressional District in Kansas introduced a bill for debt 
reduction in the House on March 26 , 1947, calling for 
$10,000,000,000 payment on the principa l and i nterest of 
the United States debt each year. 1 In supporting such legi s-
lation that year and again in 1948, Cole emphasized the fact 
that it was t h e duty of Congress to bring order to the Govern-
ment; something , he added, the people of the United States 
lcongressional Record, 80 Cong., 1 Sess. (Washington: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 2678. 
Hereinafter cited as Congressional Record. 
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deserved. The 1948 plan for r edu ction was modifi ed t o the 
extent that foreign a id, debt r educt i on , and t ax r educt ion 
could work to gether to ach i ev e a common end . Cole b elieved 
each aim should be d ev ised i n an order and sys t em t hat each 
would work tog et her to achi ev e solv en t gov ernment; separate 
functioning would mos t as su r edly cause a f a. i l ure in ea ch t o 
bring the de s ired goal of re s toring san ity to the Gover nm en t. 
The plan would us e for e i gn a i d for s t i mula tion of pr odu ction 
abroad of goo ds u seful in t h e Unit ed Sta t es to r epl a c e worth-
less forei gn currency; a prop erly administ er ed debt reduc -
tion of $5,000, 000,000 ea ch y ear wou l d trim governmen t costs, 
promot e inv estment by d estroying "explos i ve Government b onds ," 
and safeguard s avings; a t ax r educti on prov iding a curb on 
inflati on by halting d emands f or wage i nc r eas es and enc our a3-
2 ing industri a l product i on. 
The abov e exc er p ts from a speech by Cole expressed his 
fundamental thinking r el a tiv e to fore i gn a i d . The de t a ils 
of foreign ai d pl ann i l16 , a s h e wished t o understand it , were 
expounded before the Hous e on March 25 , 1948 . To Cole the 
pro posed Marshall plan, if properly admini s t er ed through 
taggi ng wher e ea ch dolla r was go i ng and for wha t pu r pose the 
money was to b e spent, was an as suranc e of the pr ev en tion 
2congressiona l Record, 80 Cong ., 2 Seas ., p . Al33 . 
This ma t erial is t aken from a r ad i o addr es s g iv en by Col e 
over t h e Nati onal Broadca st ing Company on J anu ary 9 , 1948 . 
56 
of another war. Cole wanted a progressive plan creating 
greater production in Europe than the 1938 standard inasmuch 
as he believed that returning the world to the pre-war con-
ditions would entail "economic stagnation" ultima t ely pro-
ducing an explosive situa tion , ripe for a third world war. 
The $5,000,000,000 contemplated expenditure over the first 
twelve-month period, a s Cole defined it, would equal the 
difference in United States exports and imports ov er the 
same peri od. Was te in the program could be checked by 11 the 
actions and vig ilance of the democratic peoples who are to 
receive the aid. 11 3 
The Administration's economic record prior to 1948 
had not been remarkable in Cole's estimation. Accordin g to 
Cole, Truman had failed in such economic affairs as post-
war price control, converting industry from war-time pro-
duction to peace-time production, and post-war taxation. 
Cole could see potential waste in 'rruma.n ' s foreign aid pro-
gram, but he strongly believed the waste of the progr am would 
be checked abroad by a conscientious administrator. In 
add.i tion to this, Cole believed t he forei gn aid plan should 
be passed on the faith that t he plan would ga in strength by 
removing the weaknesses from Washington either by replacing 
the economically inefficient President Truman in the November 
3congressional Record, 80 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 3559. 
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elections or by replac ing all administration and -authority 
of the plan beyond the reach of the administration. 
The strengths of the plan were list ed by Cole as being 
the following : (1) a n ew orienta tion in world though t and 
(2) a new orientati on i n world trade based on post-war trade 
tendencies, tha t is, preventing the world from drifting into 
the no longe r a pplica ble pre-war trade channel. This n ew 
orienta tion of worl d trade would assis t the American economy. 
As an example of t h i s , Cole maintained tha t Kansas and Alberta 
would have to r eplace the Ukraine as t he source of wheat for 
Europe. In a n ew orienta ti on of world trade Germany would 
not be restored as a world suppli e r, Japan wou l d not r egain 
her forme r markets, nor would the Soviet Union ga in new 
markets. For these t wo r easons , wo rld thought and world trade 
orientation, Cole support ed the Economic Coopera t i on .A ct of 
1948. 4 The price of non-support was much gr eater in the 
eyes of Cole than the price for supporting this plan , even 
with the fact tha t the expense of t he prog r am would not r e a ch 
i ts height. 
In a spe ech at the First Congressional District of t he 
Young Republican Club convention at Holton, Kansas, on April 
17, 1948, Cole praised the effects that the Economic Coopera tion 
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Act would have ·on World recovery. However, he gave the 
credit of the succes s to the Republicans in Cong ress who , he 
s a id; had passed the ori g inal l e g islation in it s p r esent form, 
and t h a t the plan was being managed by Republi c an Paul Gray 
Hoffman. He added that the leg i s l ati on was "a tremendou s 
effort to stem the t:i'.de of despair and war."5 
Col e co n tinu ed t o support fore i g n aid leg islation i n 
1 949 and 1950. However , i n 1 951, his v i e ws were al t e r ed by 
the prog re ss of Europe in economic recov ery. He express ed 
his chang e of mind at Topeka , Kansas , on December 29 , 1 950, 
while speaking to t he Topeka Optimist Club . The p o stwar 
ai d to Eu rope, commented Co l e , had reached an end and a new 
phase was commen cin g . Tha t new phase was milita ry aid 
instea d of economic aid. The spending of funds under the 
Economic Cooperat ion Administration should be r epla ced by 
concrete milita ry aid. The t wo reasons for his decision in 
1 9 51 were li s t ed by Cole a s: (1) the economic recov e ry of 
Eu rope under EGA funds had been succe s sful, but EGA funds did 
not p romo te a military build u p , and (2) direct milita r y a id 
to European allies would 11 eliminate phony dolla r fri end s , sav e 
· d f d't " 6 monay, and g et value receive or expen 1 ures. 
Cole supported the Mutual Security Act of 1 951 because 
5rbid., p. A3114. 
6congressional Re cord, 8 2 Con g ., 1 Sess ., p . A7 943. 
it started the gradual change from purely economic aid to 
military assistance. 
REPRESENTATIVE HOPE 
Representative Clifford Ragsdale Hope , of the Fifth 
District in Kansas, declared his support for emergency 
European a i d and for t he Marshall Plan while on a trip 
studying a master farm pro gram with t h e House CoIIID1ittee on 
Agriculture. 7 At Rocky Mount, North Carolina, October 17 , 
1947, he predic ted the passage of the Marshall Plan in the 
next session of Congress. 8 
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His acceptance of the Marshall Plan principles centered 
around his belief that such a plan was the price the United 
States would h ave to pay as a result of food abundance . The 
policy of feeding the rest of a hungry world necessitated a 
postponement in foo d. cost reduction for the citizens of the 
Uni tea. Sta tes. The American surplus would be needed in order 
t o feed. the rest of t he world , and the Agriculture Department I s 
price-support policy would be needed for protecting the farmers 
agains t price collaps e . Therefor e , the American consumer woul d 
have to continue paying high prices for food. 9 
7New York Times, October 18, 1947, p. 5. 
Sibid. 
9conp;ressi ona.l Record., 80 Cong ., 1 Sess., pp. A2250-51. 
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In a speech at Wichita, Kansas, on December 4, 1947, 
Hope stressed: 
This thing of foreign relief must be a balanced thing. 
It must not deplete our r esources while helping needy 
nations to help themselves ••.• ! want •••• aid to do the 
job, to take the form of self help.10 
Also, in tha t same speech, Hope clearly pointed out 
that, with the events of that day , the State Department 
activities were intricably linked with thes e activities of 
the Agriculture Department. 
It was his belief tha t with a long-peac efu l world economy 
the United States could double its standard of living in 
twenty or thirty years. Organizations such a s t he American 
Farm Bureau Federation and the Couns el for the Nat ional Grang e 
agreed with Hope's assumption and supported t he European Relief 
Progr am as a policy to bring about peace. 11 
The Committee on Agriculture in the Hous e , Hope as 
Chairman, studied the farm-machinery situat ion as it existed 
in the United States and abroad. Their finding s showed t he 
proposed aid legislation quoted a fi gure for farm mach i nery 
shipments tha t was too l a r ge for t he size of t he farms in 
participating countries; the shortag e of ste el and p e troleum 
throu ghout the world would make t he quoted fi gure too costly; 
10''No More Isolati on for U.S., Says Hope," The 
Hutchinson New Herald, December 5, 1947, p. 8. 
11 ''Farm Grou p Leaders Back European .A id Plan, " Emporia 
Gazette, January 30, 1948, p. 1. 
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and increase in European agricultural production could be 
realized by other means.1 2 This was Hope's greatest criti-
cism of the proposed Marshall Plan leg islation, t h e Adminis-
tration's failure in not conducting an adequat e and deta il ed 
survey of agricultura l equipment needs both i n the United 
States an d in Europe in connection with the Marshall Plan. 1 3 
He did not wan t to send machinery to Europe tha t was in short 
supply in the United Sta t es. 
Combining a long-rang e price-support agr i cultural 
measure with the ne eds of European na tions for Amer ican food, 
Hope visualized a desired position for t h e farmers of America. 
All - out production with necessary incent i ves to protect t h e 
producers would promote stabilized agricultural pric es and 
ere.ate a surplus of farm products n eeded to carry out the 
commitments of the country's foreign policy. Hope , however, 
did not want surplus products to be substituted i nto t he aid 
program in lieu of an appropri a tion worth $1,000,000,000. In 
other words, Hope did not want surplus food appropriat ed in 
place of money, but wanted money to be appropriated, surplus 
agricultural products purchased with this money, and the 
1 2congressional Record, 80 Cong ., 2 Sess., p. 7204. 
13 11 Hope .Asks Survey First of U. s. Farm Machinery Needs, 11 
Garden City Daily Telegram, Febr~ary 11, 1948, p. 1. The 
Harriman Report set a fi gure of $545,000,000 to be used to 
purchase farm machinery for Europe throughout the four year 
period. 
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purchased goods sent to Europe. The provision sub stituting 
products was taken from the aid bill in 1950 with Hope l eading 
the attack against it. Such a provision, he said, would go 
11 counter to the agricultural program" in that it operated 
against ECA principles by not functioning through normal 
channels. 14 Operation through competative and normal channels 
would help keep farm prices up , he declared. 
Hope's attitude is plainly marked by this statement 
made on January 4, 1951: 
While I feel a continuation of our present reckless 
forei gn policy, which is being carri ed out without any 
apparent considera tion of its costs or its results, 
would be a fatal mistake, I am just as much opposed 
to a return to a policy of isolationism •••• Somewhere 
between globalism and isolationism there is room for 
a sound, realistic American for e i gn policy. 1? 
This equivocal statement is clearified somewhat by the 
role Hope desired the agricultural program would play in the 
foreign policy of the United States. He beli eved food was 
the all important implement of t he United States in conducting 
forei gn policy. In administering t hi s foreign policy , said 
Hope, t he United States would n e•ed a large surplus of farm 
goods in stockpile to make certa in domestic needs could be 
met along with t he hungry of Europe. 16 
1411 House Chops ECA Funds $250,000 ,000, u Topeka Daily 
Capital, March 29, 1950, p. 1. 
15congressional Record, 82 Cong ., 1 Sess., pp. Al4-15. 
16congressional Record, 82 Cong ., 2 Sess., p. A105. 
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By not installing markets in Europe through ECA funds, 
Hope feared countries like Germany would join the Inter-
national Wheat Agreement, which would allow them to purchase 
wheat from either Canada, Australia, or .Argentina resulting 
in the destruction of American mark ets in Europe. With fewer 
markets for United States whea t, American f a r mers would be 
forced to limit acreag e, and as a result, suffer lower incomes. 
In a speech made before t h e 1952 graduating class at 
Sterling College, Sterling , Kansas, Hope made this comment: 
I want to mak e it clear tha t I am not criticizing what 
we have done. While I h ave not be.en in accord with all 
of it and while mistakes have been made, I am convinced 
that if we had not carried out our policies of economic 
and military aid, more of the world including much of 
Western Europe would be under Communist control. Further-
more, under existing conditions I think our present 
rearmamen t program is necessary a s a holding operation , 
until more constructive and effect ive policies can be 
put i nto effect. 
My criticism is directed to t h e things we have not 
done. Had they been done at the proper time , much that 
we ar e doing now mi gh t not be needed. 17 
Hope voted "yea" for Economic Cooperation Administration 
in the years from 1948 to 1950; he voted in favor of the 
Mutual Security Administration in 1951, and continued to 
support this legi slation until he r etir ed from Congress in 
1956. Other subsequent legislation, such as aid to Pakistan 
in 1953, also caught his approving nod with stipula tions t hat 
the wheat was to be g iven to t ha t country for the gov ernment 
17Ibid., pp. A4600-0l. 
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to do with as they wished without putting any attached strings 
on the gi ft. He had introduced the bill that supplied wheat 
as a gift to Pakistan. In doing this he stated: 
I am advocating g iving away wheat! of which, we have 
an oversupply, to a friendly nation. 8 
As a conclusion to his viewpoint on foreign aid, Hope 
had stated that: 
•••• some people say we are g iving away the taxpayer's 
money, but the people of this country do not want these 
surplus agricultural commoditi e s to spoil, they do not 
want us to let them be wasted, t h ey want us to g ive them 
to hungry people •••• 
Let me further state that, in my opinion, the farm pro-
gram in this country is doomed unless we permit these 
surpluses tha t have been piling up under the program 
[support-program] to be diverted where they are needed 
to feed people who are hungry.19 
REPRESENTAT IVE MEYER 
A radio address over three stations in Kansas on May 
9, 1947, was the device used by Herbert (Hub) Alton Meyer , 
Representative from the Third. Kansas District, to express 
his views on Greek-Turkish aid. 20 In this speech he related 
some of the dubious aspects of such a venture. He wondered 
how much money, how many men, and how much equipment it would 
take to stop the s pread of Communism ov er these areas as well 
18congressiona l Record, 83 Cong ., 1 Sess., p. 7023. 
19rbid., pp. 10400-01. 
20congressional Record, 80 Cong ., 1 Sess., pp. A2238-39. 
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as the rest of Europe and Asia. He told the radio audience 
that he had serious doubts as to the value of $400,000,000, 
the orig inal investment of Greek-Turkish forei gn policy, as 
the device for stopping communism, for aid had not retarded 
the advance of communism in China, Yugoslavia, Poland, 
Rumania, or Bulgaria. He believed tha t communist ideology 
was misleading the officials of the United States into 
expanding its forei gn policy in a way to include aid programs 
that would not achieve their proposed purpos e of halting 
communism. 
It was inconsistent, he continued, to pour money into 
Greece and Turkey as combatants of Russian aggression while 
letting communism spread., without restrictions, in the United 
State s its elf. 
Another question Meyer raised in tha t address was 
whether the United State s should, with its national debt 
being $273,000,000,000, enter a realm of forei gn aid 
demanding a down payment of $400,000,000 and a progressive 
and eternal commitment. More of his arguments were: such 
a move may destroy United States economy; the officials in 
Wash i ng ton are too quick and sensitive to Stalin-made crises; 
if the United States matched each crisis with great quantities 
of the taxpayers money, the United States would financially 
b1eed to death; one nation cannot finance the rest of the 
world and stay solvent; and the best method for the United 
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State s to fight communism is to have t h e country financially 
sound. 
Meyer submitted his plan for stopping Sovi et aggr es-
sion. He told the people in Kansas that the Uni t ed Na t i ons 
organization should b e the agen t in demanding Russ ia to 
cease putting pressure on count ries in line of Sov i e t aggres-
sion. The United Nations should have been tried ou t; the 
people of the world should b e allowed to see wha t power t h is 
organizat i on really ha s, a r gu ed Mey er. 21 
Meyer wa s in favor of feeding t h e hungr y of t h e world 
only if such an act would not destroy t he solvency of t h e 
United St a t es; howev er, to Meyer t he Interi m Aid or stopgap 
forei gn aid measure was a bill which was seemingly devoid of 
restrictions; which gave re~i ef to France and Italy in the 
form of $597,000,000 for coal and $35,000,000 f or petrol eum 
when coal stockpil es in France were lack ing due to strikes, 
and when petrol eum for ga soline was scarc e in t h e Uni t ed 
States; and wh ich would assist France i n pay i ng off i nteres t 
on t h e Fr ench forei gn d ebt to Belg ium ( $17, 000,000), to 
Brazil ( $26, 000,000), and to t h e Interna tional Monetary Fund 
• ($10,000,000). No payment of French debts to t he United 
21Ibid. Meyer used the exampl e of Iran in 1946 in 
expl a ining tha t the Unit ed Na tions Organization has force-
fulnes s when dealing with aggr ession. He vi ewed t he situation 
with praise. and credited the withdra wal of Sovi e t troops from 
Iran as due to Unit ed Nations action. 
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States was mentioned including the food taken into Germany 
by France which should. have been credited to the United 
State s. The above , as Mey er rela ted, was not aid to the 
needy as wa.s suggested in the wording of the bill. Nor could 
the spending of billions stop the s pread of communism when 
shipments of heavy machinery, petroleum, and other ma t erials 
were sent to Rus s ia, the mainspring of communism. For t hese 
reasons, the legi sla tion, Meyer beli eved, could not accom-
plish its intended purpose and would enfeeble the economy 
of t h e United States i n a way tha t would cause i nfl a tion, 
whereby vulnerability to attack would be the outcome sub-
stituted for the strength n eeded to match the expandi ng 
Russian economy. Meyer could not support this l egi slat ion 
because he felt tha t voting for stopgap aid would bind him 
to a vote in favor of the long-rang e Marshall Plan, which, 
he considered, would. b e an eternal and unlimited extension 
22 of stopgap aid. 
The Government of t he Unit ed St a t es should take care 
of its aged and needy a t home, Meyer beli eved. And , he main-
tained , infla tion would eventua lly l ead to pol ice state 
tactics of establishing cont rols ov er t he da ily life of indi-
viduals. But he stated: 
••• while I yield to no one in t he desir e to f eed the 
22con5ressional Record, 80 Cong ., 1 Ses s ., pp. 4800-01. 
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hungry and clothe the naked, I cannot in good conscience 
support this so-called stopgap forei gn relief measure.23 
Meyer wanted priva te charitable organizations to dis-
tribute provisions to the needy of the world. If t h e United 
States Government distributed the s e good s, h e said, t h er e 
would be too much waste caused by black market competition 
and inefficiency. 
In 1948, however, Meyer was conv erted to t he. rank s of 
the Marshall Plan supporters. His -speech in the House on 
March 30, 1948, confirmed this. He began: 
••• I shall vote for t h is European recover y program. 
This blunt statement is not to be construed as ind ic ating 
tha t this has been an easy decision for me to mak e. I 
can think of no question or problem which ha s g iven me 
more concern than t hat posed by this measure. It is 
the most momentous and soul-wrack i ng issue ev er presen-
ted to me in Congress or out •••• 24 
He decided to vote for the Marshall Plan for four 
reasons. The first argumen t he gave in support of his 
decision was tha t the plan was launched in a pool of prop-
aganda, making many men skeptical, but Meyer considered that 
the communist threat to world peace was i ncrea s ed con siderably 
by the failure of post-war forei gn policies of t h e Unit ed 
State s, and that this "Bitter fruit of appeasement" should 
be replaced with a program not as nega tive in na ture a s former 
post-war policy, ev en if the Marshall Plan was only to be a 
23Ibid. 
24congressional Record, 80 Cong ., 2 Sess., p. 3749. 
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calculated risk. His second reason was t hat the plan's intrin-
sic value outwei ghed the drain on the economy of the United 
States. The United State s could not, however, continue in the 
future years to be an 11 interna tional Santa Claus. 11 Meyer was 
happy to learn that the program was to be a separate part of 
the State Departmen t and apart from the Truman a dminis t r ation. 
He listed this as his t h ird reason for his support of the 
measure , and his fourth reason wa s that he believed the 
majority o f the people in his district were i n fav or of the 
p lan. He had conducted a poll includ i ng some 2,000 people in 
the Third District, and, even with the possibility of the 
influence of t h e Administrati on's propaganda in shaping the 
opinions of the p eople in Kansas , Meyer b eliev ed the favorable 
response toward the Marshall Plan shown in this poll was the 
typical thinking of his d istrict. 25 
Many Cong ressmen were persuaded in the ir thinking by 
the 1 948 coup~• etat in Czechoslovakia. Meyer seemed to be 
one of these men. His statemen t admitting that he s aw uno 
alterna tive now at this late hour but to accept" t he ri sk 
indica t ed his concern over world condi tions. 26 In t he light 
ll II of the four points mentioned above, Meyer voted yea on 




Meyer visualized the plan as the best policy introduced up 
to then and should be tried as a way of preven ting another 
war. Watching during the first year of applica tion to see 
whether the Economic Cooperation Administration would actually 
benefit Europe and conversely help the United States, Meyer 
a g ain voiced his view in 1949 which was only slightly chang ed 
from his 1 948 opinion on the ECA prog r am. He admitted t h e 
fact that EGA money put European people back to work , helped 
them earn money in order to purchase g oods a nd commo d i t i e s, 
fed them, and put tools in their hands; all the above r e lieved 
the pressure of communism. 27 Hungry, jobless people are 
more interested in communism. This was the objective of 
his view of the plan in 1 948. However, in 1949 , Meyer 
believed some of his suspicions concerning the forei gn aid 
program had been confirmed by this one-year trial. He saw 
no dollar-for-dollar return of the mon ey g i v en by the 
United State s; he saw pre cious ma terials be i ng sent to Europe, 
which prevented inflation from ebbi ng in the United Stat e s; 28 
he saw fabricated materials of Western Europe slipping into the 
hands of the Russians, via sattelite countries; and he saw 
27con~ressional Record, 81 Cong ., 1 Sess., p. A2106. 
28Ibid. Meyer based his opinion, that inflation 
would. be cut in the United State s if precious ma.terial was 
not exported as aid items to Europe, on a statemen t made by 
Secreta ry of Commerce, then European head of ECA, Averell 
Harriman. 
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that the continuation of the progr am would mean a rising cost 
to the taxpayers of the United States. As a result of his 
observat ions Meyer formulat ed one general question covering 
his criticisms or skepticism: "How much can we really afford 
to spend internationally and nationally without a back-
breaki ng tax burden?" 29 He wanted to be informed as to 
where and how the money was being spent. He could not accept 
the opinions of ma.ny that ECA funds could not be cut without 
destroying the whol e program, that Europe was still in such 
a precarious position that it would be impossible to r educe 
ECA funds ten percent, as he stated was possible without 
destroying the ECA principle. A biparti san support of the 
bill wi thout debate only grant ed a 11 blank check" to the 
Administration, he stated aga in in 1949 . He wanted debate , 
especially on reducing the amount of aid to Engl and, primarily 
because Engl and seemed to have economic con s tancy. At lea.st 
she had enough to l end money to Russia a.na expand home plans 
of nationalizing all British i ndustry. His argument for a 
slight curtailmen t of expenditures for ECA was that if the 
countri e s of Europe collapse into the arms of Rus s i a as a 
result of ECA fund reduction, then the Uni tea. States should 
buy real security, not f alse friendship constructed from 
European aid, in the form of a strong Army, Navy, and Air 
29rbid. 
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Force at home. 
Meyer voted for shaving the appropriati ons after he 
had voted in favor of continuing the Economic Co operation 
Act in 1 949 . 30 
The turning po int in his voting record came i n 1950 . 
A l etter dated J anuary 13, 1 950 , from a Conse rvative member 
of the English Parliament to a taxpayer in the Unit ed St ates 
was published in the Congressional Record by Meyer . In this 
letter the Parliamentarian prayed to God that the United 
States would not r en ew the aid-giving generosity that year . 
He blamed t he United States for contributing to the growth 
of socialism i n England as a result of the ECA program.31 
Meyer felt tha t voting for continuation of foreign 
aid money to Europe impli ed subscription to socialism in 
Europe as well as the Uni t ed States . He said : 
Yes • • • and f ancy the international 'do-gooders' over 
here still persisting t hat we continue these 'dollops 
of dollars' to keep socialism going ov er thers .32 
H1s last vote on Economic Cooperation legi slation was 
"nay. 11 33 His voice i n the argument was silen ced by death on 
Octob er 2 , 1950. 
30con5ressional Record, 81 Cong ., 1 Ses s . , p. 4422. 
31con5ressiona l Record, 81 Cong., 2 Sess ., p . 1632. 
32Ibid. 
33rbid., pp. 4552-53 
REPRESENTATIVE REES 
Edward Herbert Rees, Representative from the Fourth 
Congressional District in Kansas, voted against the Greek-
Turkish loan in 1947.34 Later, that same year, Rees sup-
ported Interim Aid to Europe with on ly a few limitation s. 
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The major restriction he formed in qualifying his stand was 
concerned with the distribution of certain good s to Europe. 
One system of distribution of the Inter im Aid goods tha t Rees 
could not agree with was the system whereby t h e United States 
would s end incentive goods such as tobacco or li quor to 
European heads of government. In the vote on the Interim Aid 
bill of 1947 Rees voted to strike out t h e word 11 incentives. 11 35 
Rees did not wish to think t hat thes e incentive goods were 
necessities. Funds appropria ted for t h e Interim Aid program, 
Rees felt, for the distribution of tobacco and liquor among 
the citizens of Europe with the hope t ha t these stimulants 
would induce the Europeans to produce more goods of necessity, 
such as food, was a waste of t h e taxpayer's money. This bribe 
would not work, Rees believed, and t h e European people should 
not receive tobacco or liquor from the Unit ed States. The 
34congressional Record, 81 Cong ., 1 Sass., p. 4975. 
35Ibid., p. 11169. Another amendment offered by 
Representative John Suinglius Anderson of California was to 
charge additional surplus material sent to Europe amounting 
to about $100,000,000 to the base $599,000,000 of the ori-
ginal relief bill was supported by Rees. Ibid., p. 11281. 
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United States instead should supply the various necessities 
such as food, medical supplies, clothing , fu el, fertilizer, 
and seed directly to the people of Europe until they were 
able to produce these suppli e s themselves. 
Rees may not have been a prohibitionist in the strict 
sense of the word , but in certa in of his action s directed 
against the distilleries it seems evident tha t he may be 
classifi ed as a somewhat moderate prohibitionist, at least 
during 1947 and 1948. He joined Senator Capper in the attack 
on liquor advertisement in the United States, he joined others 
in t h e House in attempting to limit the amount of grain sold 
to American distilleries, and in order to make the most of 
the aid from the United St ates, as he said, Rees offered an 
amendment prohibiting the shipment of grain abroad for the 
production of distilled beverages.36 A strictly prohibitionist 
motive, simple dislike of alcholic beverages, may or may not 
have been the driving force behind these actions on the part 
of Rees. He remarks that the United States and the world 
are short of grain and cannot afford to use limited supplies 
of grain for use in making alcholic beverages. It was his 
belief that much of the farm l and in France used in the growing 
of grapes for the purpose of making wine should be planted 
to grains. His argument on this point was that these countries 
36rbid., p. 11272. 
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needed food--food in the form of grains. 
When the debate on Economic Cooperation legislation 
came to a climax in 1 948 , Rees was still not in favor of 
sending tobacco to Europe as a relief item at the expense of 
the United States taxpayers. He wa.s answered by Representa-
tive Virgil Munday Chapman of Kentucky, who stated that the 
surplus tobacco sent to Europe as a relief item in addition 
to food would pay $1,200,000,000 in taxes each year. How-
ever, this answer was not sufficient in Rees' mind to justify 
the need for the Government to buy surplus tobacco and s end 
it to Europe.37 Up to t he time and during the debate on 
appropriations for Economic Cooperation funds, Rees believed 
certa in i terns could be reduced or deleted from the measure. 
Such reductions were in the areas of (1) tobacco; (2) coal to 
Great Britain when Poland and Germany had a surplus; (3) 
petroleum which was in short supply in the United States ; 
and (4) tractors. Rees believed that the $90,000,000 allotted 
for tractors could be cut at least ninety per cent. Since 
the Europeans did not know how to use tractors and since 
European farms were small, Rees would keep the $10,000,000 
remaining after the ninety per cent cut in the allotment for 
tractors to buy horses and horse-drawn machinery, which, in 
his thinking , would be more practical for the European 
37oon5ressional Record, 80 Cong ., 2 Sess., pp. 3762-63. 
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conditions. 38 He· also disagreed with appropriating $2,000,000 
for agricultural experiment stations in forei gn count ries 
as this item could be eliminated, along with others, without 
putting the plan into jeopardy. 
On March 31, 1948, Rees offered an amendment which he 
later withdrew in favor of an amendment by Representative 
Edward Jame s Devitt of Minnesota, providing ocean-free trans-
portation of reli e f packages to Europe.39 Rees was the 
chairman of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Serv ice, 
and he believed the amendment would serve the purpose of 
extending friendship from the United State s to Europe. The 
Post Office Department was to be r e imbursed from the funds 
appropriated for forei gn relief a t a reduced rate, while the 
Maritime Commission would provide shipping space for these 
parcels. 
Representative Rees was alarmed at the scarcity of 
information concerning the program. He b el ieved citiz ens of 
the United States were entitled to more information regarding 
38rbid., p. 7193. 
39rbid., p. 3849. The amendment by Devitt is as follows: 
"to provide ocean-free transportation and to defray port char-
ges on relief supplies furnished by voluntary nonprofit relie•f 
ag encies and on individual relief packages from the U.S4 to 
Europe, and to make mandatory the execution of agreements 
between the Administrator and the recipient countries by the 
terms of which moneys in the so-called revolving fund shall be 
used to pay the transportation charges for such supplies and 
relief packages from the point of arrival in Europe to the place 
of residence of the addressee." 
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foreign policies because, he argued, wise decisions cannot be 
made on rumors and hints. However, Rees concluded in favor 
of backing the 1948 program for these reasons: (1) it had the 
endorsement of many great leaders who had spent a considerable 
amount of time in direct study of the proposal; (2) it had the 
approval of many people of the country who considered the 
program as a way to prevent another world crisis; and (3) it 
seemed to have the hope of bring ing a better understanding 
among nations in preventing the suffering of people. 40 He 
supported, without much enthusiasm, the legislation for these 
three reasons in the hope tha t the funds would be properly 
administered and would accomplish what its sponsors believed 
it would. 
The next year, 1949, Re es again voted "yea" for the 
extension, amendment, and appropri a tion of the Economic 
Cooperation Act. He voted in favor of t h e 1949 ECA in the 
spirit that the United States had al r eady committed itself 
on that policy and that it was only a question of carrying 
out the promises. The appropriations for all items contained 
within the measure, Rees stated, should be carefully scru-
tinized, eliminating any aid not needed, making sure that 
American products were purchased with the American money, and, 
in general , making all the saving s possible under the bill. 41 
40Ibid., p. 3823. 
41congressional Record, 81 Cong., 1 Sass ., p. A2290. 
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Representative James Thomas Patterson of Connecticut 
introduced an amendment in 1949 intended to permit small 
businesses to participate in the ECA program; such partici-
pation would not only be fairer to the small busines ses by 
allowing them to participate in the measure but it would also 
stimulate more competition in supplying goods to be used in 
the program, directly lowering the prices. Rees favored 
this Patterson proposal along with the amendm ent offered by 
Representativ e Leonar d. Irving of Mis souri to provide for the 
milling of twenty-five per cent of EGA wheat in the United 
States. This latter measure was included in the 1948 ECA plan, 
but it was again debated in 1949 in connection with small-
business participation in the 1949 ECA program. It is possible 
that Rees would support the Irving Amendment because he wa s 
concerned with the problem confronting the small mill ing 
industries a.round the country, a probl em created by the fact 
tha t several thousand small mills were shut down or running 
at less than ca.paci ty. Due, to the importance of the milling 
industry in Kansas, Rees associated this nation-wide problem 
with Kansas, and to promote business for th ese industries 
would mean, in the outcome, more wealth for the stat e of Kansas. 
In 1950 Rees chang ed his vote relative to foreign aid. 
In April of 1950, Rees had stated: 
Personally, I am deeply concerned with regard to the 
tremendous expenditure of the taxpayers of this country 
in its attempt to bring about a better understanding 
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between the nations of the world . 42 
It was his opinion that the Government of the United 
States had no money, was opera ting at a deficit, had a larg e 
national debt, a n d an unbalanced bu d.g et , all of which would 
contribute to a welfare state. 43 The new Congress should , 
therefore, cut forei gn aid app ~opria tions almost in h a lf, 
from $4,500 ,000,000 to $2 ,000 ,000,000, and at the same time 
balance the bud g et an d reduce taxes . 
One criticism by members of Congress during the Truman 
Administration was tha t Truman refused to submit cost esti -
mates to Congress and to the public. Represen t a tiv e Joseph 
Mart in, Republican floor leader of the House, appointed a 
twenty-one member 11 price-tag 11 committee in order tha t Congress 
might be informed as to the costs of proposed leg i s l a tion, 
and Rees was appointed to this committee. 44 From his 
observ at i ons , both in the United States and abroad, Rees 
concluded tha t the responsibility of the Unit ed Sta tes to 
rehabilitate the peoples of the world, as the 1 948 leg isla tion 
supposedly attempted to do , no long er was t h e objective of 
forei gn aid in 1950. By the use of statistics, Rees con-
cluded that the United States was sending $800 per American 
42Ibid. 
43Topeka Daily Capital, J anuary 6, 1950, p. 21. 
44Topeka Daily Capital, January 16, 1 950 , p~ 12. 
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family to underdeveloped areas in an attempt to el ev a t e t heir 
standard of living to a point comparable to tha t of their 
benefactor. Sending aid to the world as a way of stopping 
the spread of communism was, to Rees, actua lly only a gui s e 
used by the forei gn policy formul a ters in tha t t he countri es 
accepting t h e a.id were not t hos e threatened by communism. 45 
Rees visited Europ e durin g the f all of 1949. It was 
his vi ew tha t the countri es of t h is area were still in n eed 
of direct food relief; however, he felt t ha t t he Unit ed 
States should g ive this food directly to t he people i nstead 
of to the governmental heads who h ad in the past act ed a s 
middle-men. He also emphasized tha t food production in 
Europe was, as of the end of 1949, almost as high as the 
pre-war era. 46 
The $3,000,000,000 proposed authorizati on, in add ition 
to about $10,000,000,000 which was authoriz ed but not expended 
I 
at that time, was too great an amount in h i s thinking . He 
wanted Congress to authorize only t h e funds absolutely n eeded 
to send food or clothing or medical suppli e s to Europe and 
not one item more. 47 Other items, he argu ed, such as h eavy 
machinery and building plant s, would be sent to Europ e at 
45congressional Record, 81 Gong., 2 Sess., p. 4162. 
46rbid. 
47rbid., p. 7538. 
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the expense of the Unit ed Sta t e s taxpayers and would be out-
side the purpose of restoring a pre-war economy in Europe. 
He maintained that the starving people of the world. received 
little if any assistance from sending heavy industrial g oods 
abroad and, t herefore, these g oods or the money for these 
g oods should be loaned to the governments of the se countries.48 
He believed t ha t the United States Treasury could not afford 
any more grants of money for forei gn aid expenditures . He 
ma.de this comment about the Treasury : 
I wonder if we realize tha t our country has a grea ter 
debt oblig ation tha n all of the other countries in the 
world combined.49 
He lauded the 1950 plan of the State Department con-
cerning the disposal of such surplus go ods as dried egg s and 
milk. The Commodity Credit Corporation earmarked 73,000,000 
pounds of dried egg s and. 170,000,000 pounds of dried milk for 
disposal as allocations to welfa re organizations .5° Rees 
no long er believed t he Cong ress of the Unit ed Stat es should 
pass forei gn a.id legislation because of previous commitments 
to countries abroad. as he had formerly agreed. . He stated: 
•.. I supported leg isla,tion providing for billions of 
dollars for defens es in this country , and because of 
commitments made with certain European countri es, I have 
also supported a con siderable amount of funds to carry 
48Ib1d. 
49rb1d. 
50Ibid., p. 1512. 
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out such commitments. I think, however, there must be a 
time when we should call a halt in the authorizations and 
appropriations a gainst the people of this country espe-
cially in consideration of tremendous sums a lr eady appro-
priated.51 
Sending billions of dollars abroad, affirmed Rees , was 
not the way to solve the problem. Friendship could not be 
purchased especially when it was bankrupting the Treasury of 
the United States. 
Because of his concern for locking the nat i on's vault 
and establishing an agency to determine the efficiency of the 
Governm ent, Rees introduced a bill to provide a Congressional 
Commi ssion on Government Efficiency and Economy.52 His atti-
tude also made it impossible for him to vote "yea" for Mutual 
Security in the period 1951 to 1959, for he considered t h is 
nonessential aid to underdev eloped countri es . He supported 
amendments designed to reduce appropriations, such as t h e Kem 
Amendments proposed by Representative J ames Pre ston Kem before 
the House to reduce the amount of appropriations. Rees intro-
duced amendments before the Hou s e to limit t he number of 
employees receiving a $15,000 per year compensat i on within 
the Mutual Security Administration from one hundred employees 
to sixty; subtract the $816,000,000 unexpended 1950 appropriation s 
51congressional Record, 82 Cong ., 1 Sess·., p. 10284. 
52rbid., pp. 190-01. Congress was to be advised at all 
times by the above mentioned Committee with respect to proper 
or improper and unnecessary use of Federal funds or nonessen-
tial Federal expenditures. 
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from the 1951 $7,482,000,000 fi gure; and reduce the total 
appropriations for aid to India and Pak i s tan from $237,155,866 
to $204,555,866. The latter amendment was rejected by a vote 
of eighty-seven to one hundred and on e. Rees an d t h ose in 
support of limiting appropriations for the $8,000,000,000 
Mutual Security were quite unsuccessful in t heir mis s ion for 
that yea r. 
In t h e last yea r of the Truman administra tion Ree s used 
t h e s am e a r gum en t s aga inst extending Mutu a l Security l eg i s -
l at ion. After hearing t he President's St a t e of t h e Union 
Address on January 10, 1 952 , Re es had this to say: 
The President has handed Congre s s t he bigg es t p eacetime 
budget submitted by any President. We r ealize t ha t a 
great shar e of t h e funds r equested i s for defense pur-
poses .••. 
It seems incredible t ha t t hi s administra tion and those 
in charg e of administer ing the affa irs of t h i s country 
would at such a critical time insist t hat t he costs and 
charges of the departments of Gov ernment b e i ncreased •••• 
••• it is dangerous, yes, appalling , t o con t emplate 
billions of dollars of deficit wh en t h e tax cha r g e s a r e 
r each i ng the point of c onfisca t i on • 
••• It is my judgmen t t ha t with s ound economy, and by 
elimination of unnec essary expend i t ur e s ou r budg e t can be 
balanced, and without the n ecessity for additional t axes, 
or going into further debt.53 
A startling fact to Rees was the $6,900,000, 000 reques-
ted in 1952 for the Mutual Security program in addition to 
$12,000,000,000 already appropria t ed but unexp end ed from 
previous allotments. This appro ximatly $19,000,000,000 was 
53congressional Record, 82 Cong ., 2 Sess., p. 508. 
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more than the proposed 1952 fiscal year expenditures for civi-
lian agencies in the United States. As a way for expressing 
his views on this matter, Rees quoted John Foster Dulles, 
then chief adviser on forei gn policy for the United States: 
With nations, as with men, money is no substitute for 
character. Our Nation today is spending fabulous sums 
for security. The largest this year is about $60,000,-
000,000. We have given away, in one form or another, 
about $40,000,000,000 since 1 945. If money could buy 
security and happiness, we should have them.54 
It was evident to Rees that the expenditures under 
this legislation were not as care fully checked as they should 
be. He atta cked the policy of financing expensive improve-
ments abroad such as power dams and fl ood con trol when more 
of these same improv ements were needed in the United States. 
It seemed to Rees that the $1 2,000,000,000 already on 
hand was a sufficient amount of money to carry on the security 
program if the money was spen t wisely . Therefore , in 1 952, 
Rees voted again st extending the Mutual Security program. 
His attitude remained the same throughout discussions on t hi s 
matter in the years up to 1 959. His argum ents r emained the 
same, that you cannot spend more than $4,000,000,000 a year 
in carrying out the aid program, and it was senseless to 
appropriate anything above t his amount; unexpended funds 
should be used first in meeting the $4,000,000,000 if such 
a need is presen t; and. that more experienced businessmen 
54rb1d., p. 5911. 
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were needed as advisers to the United States Government, 
replacing the "striped-pants corps" of t he St ate Department 
as a way to guard against the State Department signing 
economically weak treaties. 55 His vote agains t the Mutual 
Security Acts as a package vote, voting for all the items on 
one vote, was a protest vote against waste and inefficiency 
caused by the surplus of unexpended funds. 
REPRESENTATIVE SCRIVNER 
The Republican leaders in t h e Ei ghtieth Congress 
selected Errett Power Scrivner, Representative from the 
First Congressional District in Kansa s, as a member of the 
Committee on Appropriations for the reason that he was t he 
Kansas Congressman who knew how to say no, knew 11 what it 
take s to say 'no', and •.• [knew h ow toJ •.. sticl{ to it. 11 56 
Aid to European countries was usually a subject in which 
Scrivner gave the per sistant answer of no. 
As early as December 18, 1 947 , Representa tive Scrivner 
advised his colleagues tha t they should as cert ain the full 
meaning of the Harvard speech of June 5, 1947 . He entered 
his remarks dealing with the early debate over the Marshall 
55congressional Record, 83 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 5618. 
56clif Stratton, "Clif Stratton Writes," Topeka Daily 
Capital, March 30~ 1949, p. 4. Hereinafter cited as Stratton, 
"Stratton Writes. 
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Plan in the Congressional Record , including within that 
speech warnings on Chinese aid and European stopgap aid of 
that year. 57 He wrote Secretary Marshall on July 9 , 1947, 
asking for more informat i on on the Marshall Plan. His 
questions were on plan formulat ion. Whose idea was it? What 
was its purpose ? When was it actually brough t into exi stence? 
What forei gn policy i mplica tion s did i t have? What approach 
to European problems? How much will it cost? What measures 
have been us ed in Euro pe to make r eady for r eceip t of su ch 
aid? How will it effect United St ates economy?58 Marshall's 
reply on July 29 , 1947, seems only to have add ed fuel to 
Scrivner's skepticism. President Truman's call to Congress 
for Gr eek-Turkish aid, said Scrivner, was one of economic 
wei ght; ask ing for f ood, fu el , clothing , medical suppli es , 
and fertili zer . However , Scrivner found t hat Gr eece and 
Turkey received a greater amount of milita ry a i d than the 
purely economic ai d listed above upon pas sage of the Truman 
Doctrine . Greece and Turkey were not being economically 
reconstructed, they were being fortified. Marshall's letter 
i n answer to Scrivner's letter con firmed t hat t h e so-ca lled 
Marshall Plan was not a plan nor a doctrine . This answer 
was not sufficiently explicit, Scrivner believed, to base an 
57con5ressional Record, 80 Cong., 1 Sess ., p . 11627. 
58congressional Record, 80 Cong ., 2 Sess., pp. 582-83. 
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opinion upon, although his doubt as to the worth of the 
plan appears strongly in his speech. He considered the 
possibility that European recovery would include such places 
as Japan, Korea, and other Asiatic countries, and the possi-
bility that these places would not be helped economically 
but fortified as Greece and Turkey had been earlier. 
Another reflection of weakness, the Representative 
contended, was the manner in which the Administration pre-
sented the proposal, stirring support by painting a gloomy 
picture of world conditions; the brink of crises, which, 
Scrivner interpreted Secretary of Defense Jame s For restal 
as predicting, must cost t h e United States a sizable defense 
appropriation, intolerable, as well as misidentified, in the 
real event, unless the ·$16,000,000,000 plus forei gn a id bill 
was passed; and War Secretar y Kenneth Claiborn e Royall prog-
nosticating a return to the draft in one sentence and saying 
"there is no immenent thr eat of war" in a l a te r one. 59 
In a newsletter to his constituents, Sc r ivner bla sted 
the use of loan or aid money for the use of bolstering a 
socialist program in England. He did not ch erish the t h ought 
of helping England regain and build up her colonies by 
sending Americ an dollars to Grea t Brita in. Th is wa s not self-
help, the aid which Europe needed: food, clothing, shelter. 
59stratton, "Stratton Writes, 11 Janu ary 29 , i 948, p. 4. 
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Scrivner indicated that the British colonial expansion 
would be greatly enhanced and tha t England could grow on a 
socialistic . basis if t he United States sent Marshall Plan 
aid to t ha t country.60 
These thing s s eem to hav e been the chief reasons for 
Scrivner's 11 nay 11 vote in the House on March 31, 1948 , when 
the Marshall Plan l egislati on was passed in t he Hous e . Pre-
viously, he had voted agai nst Europ ean int erim aid (December 
15, 1 947), against Gr e ek- Tu rkish a id (May 9 , 1947), but had 
vot ed. for a reduction of t he amount of funds authorized for 
relief assistance (April 30, 1 947). 61 Scrivner also v oted 
for the amendmen t introduc ed by Repr esent ative William Meyers 
Colmer and Senator Karl Earl Mundt tha t excluded aid to 
Russian-controlled countri es (April 30 , 1 947). 
It was a somewhat different story in 1 949. Scrivner's 
vote on the Economic Cooperation Act of that year changed 
from a "nay" to a "yea." In a statement made in March , 1949, 
Scrivner not ed a partial success for European recovery a s it 
concerned industrial reconstructi on , yet he notices a situation 
60 11 scrivner Oppos e s European Aid Plan," Topeka Dai ly 
Capital, Febru ary 19 , 1 948 , p. 3. 
6lcongressional Record, 80 Cong ., 1 Sess., p . 4292 . 
This was the amendmen t to House Resolution 153, whi ch reduced 
amount of funds authorized from $350,000,000 to $200,000,000, 
introduced by Repr esen t a tive Bartel John Jonkman of Mich i gan. 
This amendmen t was agreed to bv a vot e of 225 to 165. All 
II 'l'I members from Kans a s vot ed yea. 
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that would likely weaken Am erican business. He comments: 
European Relief money, materials and mach ines hav e so 
restored some Eu ropean countri e s that t hey ar e t ak i ng 
over many American export mar kets. Th is will mean l ess 
work for the Am erican taxpay ers whos e ha r d-ear ned dolla rs 
pay for t h e pro gr am . The f eeding hand is be i ng b itten. 
If the tee t h mar k s grow too numerou s and. go too deep t h e 
hand will b e crippled.62 
With the progress of the ECA in Eu rope , and wi t h the 
amount of un expended funds h el d ov er f or use in 1949 , 
Scrivner vo ted f or the 1949 l egi s l ation in the hop e t h a t t h e 
authority f or carrying out t he measures woul d be r emoved 
from the h and s of t he . .Adm i n i s trat i on . 
Aga in in 1950 , a s in 1948 , t he Repr esentative fr om the 
Sec ond Di s t rict voted aga i ns t t he Economic Coop er a tion Act. 
The 1950 version was a mere exten sion of t h e 1 949 bill, but 
t h e amount of fund s proposed _ t o be au t ho riz ed. seemed t oo 
h i gh to Sc rivner. To h im , as to many other Congressmen , t he 
size of t h e na tional debt wa s al a r mi ng . The communis t 
anouncement t hat they would force t he Uni ted St a t e s t o s pend 
i ts elf i nto bankru p tcy s eemed qu i te log i cal to him . Still, 
h e poin t ed out tha t t h e United St a t e s i n s isted on s pending 
billions to counter the t hrea t of communism, promot ing a 
situa tion whereby t h e nation would grow financi ally weak er 
ea ch day. He offer ed t h is sta t emen t for the purpos e of 
showi ng the na t ional debt: 
On December 30 , 1 949 , t h e Trea sury r eport shows t ha t 
62stratton, "Stra tton Writ es," March 30 , 1 949 , p. 4. 
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Uncle Sam had spent $3,229,798,921.52 more than had been 
received sin ce July 1, 1 949. 
Our national debt as of January 1, 1950 , was $257 ,-
160,110,000.09, gn increase of $4,305,708,539 .54 over 
January 1, 1 949.b3 
These fi gures were also used by Scrivner t o explain 
the reason why taxes must remain high , unjustly putting a 
burden on the workers of the United States, inasmuch as the 
national debt could be lowered. His obstinacy in regard to 
limiting the amount of forei gn aid, if not eliminating the 
program in its entirety , was maintained in a House debate with 
Representatiyes Jacob Koppel Javits, John Kee , and Walter 
Henry Judd on March 29, 1 950. These t h ree men attempted to 
convince Scrivner t hat the United States had everything to 
do with determining how the aid money was to be divided and 
how it was to be s pent. Scrivner con tinued to believe t hat 
the seventeen recipient nations decided how to divid e and 
spend the money. The Economic Cooperat ion .Administration 
Director had little voice in the matter, Scrivner believed, 
nor would Scrivner credit the counterpart fund as an effec-
tive de~ice since, as he i n t erpreted the system , European 
nations could determ ine what they could do with the money 
that was collected by individual forei gn countries as a result 
of purchases from the Economic Coopera tion .Administration 
Director. The money did not go to the EC.A Director to be s ent 
63congressional Record, 81 Cong ., 2 Sess., pp. 574-75. 
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to the United States but this money spent for commodities 
in the United States was put into a counterpart fund, which 
was kept in the country, and which Scrivner objected to, 
especially when these funds were used for that country's debt 
reduction or public relief. Judd agreed. that countries could 
reduce their national debts with these counterpa rt funds , 
but in doing this they had to have pe rmission from the 
director of t he Economic Cooperation .Administrat i on; and 
when agreement was made , t h e United States could never receive 
anything out of the fund as direct currency repayment. The 
Congressman from Kansas agreed tha t the United States would 
never be repaid for the billions sent to Europe . 64 He refused 
to agree with the philosophy of the three men, however, and 
he would not g ive credence to the benefit of indirect 
security repayments, which , the three men believed, would be 
far greater t han the orig inal investmen t of foreign aid because 
the aid money would be stimula ted by counterpart funds , 
ultima tely contributing to the economic stability in Europe. 
On March 31, 1950 , he indicated a negative vote rela ting to 
the extension of the Economic Coopera tion Act . 65 
A grassroots response in the form of a twelve-point 
questionnaire was used by Scrivner in 1951 to gain insight 
64rbid., p. 4326. 
65Ibid., pp. 4552-53. 
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in forming his opinions. Question number t en was: "Should 
we continue to supply naval, air, and army equipment to 
Western European na ti ons?" Although this question belongs 
more to a military appropriat ions apprasial, it shows a 
frequent tendency of many Congressmen to disregard information 
found in qu est ionnaires. Tho se who favor ed a continuation 
of military aid constituted 7 2 . 8 perc ent while 19 .4 percen t 
were against. Scrivner commented on this particula r qu estion 
by saying the respons es of approval were con dition ed. He 
refu sed to allow t he overwhelming approv a l by his constituents 
for mutual security to di r ect his vote i n 1 951, for he voted 
agains t the Mutual Security Act of t ha t y ea r. 
Repre senta tive Christian Herte r proposed an amendment 
in 1 952 authorizing the Secretar y of Defense to transfer 
$1,000 ,000,000 worth of i terns such as gu ns, t anks, and planes 
orig inally appropriated for defense to t he forei gn military 
program wi thout having the Mutual Securi ty Ag ency r e i mburse 
the Secreta ry of Defense . Scrivner was in compl e te disagree-
ment with this measure. It meant, to him, adding another 
$1,000,000, 000 to t h e Mutu a l Security appropri at ion s making 
t he tota l $7,889,000,000, cutting t he general milita ry bill 
from $73,000,000,000 to $72,000,000,000 , and g iving the 
Secretary of Defense the excuse of ask ing for an extra $1,000,-
000,000 in appropriations for the military bill to repla ce 
what was transfered to Mutual Security when it came time for 
9B 
mi-litary authorization in 1953.66 As a way to make sure the 
military authorization in 1953 would not be raised the 
$1,000,000,000 as a compensation for transfer of this amount 
to the Mutual Security Administration, Scrivner proposed an 
amendment to the Herter Amendmen t on May 23, 1952. Scrivner's 
Amendment stated that the military in the Unit ed States would 
be reimbursed by the MSA in the case of a transfer of $1,000,-
000,000 from the military in the Unit ed States to the MSA in 
Europe. The amendment was adopted. 
John Martin Vorys, Representa tive from Ohio, proposed 
an amendment to the MSA appropriation s bill of 1952 which 
provided for the authorization to continue unexpended funds 
of the Mutual Security Agency through June 30, 1953, and have 
them consolida ted with the appropriation authorized in 1 952. 
All the Kansas Representa ti v es voted in favor of this plan 
which passed the House . On the earlier vo t e on t h e Mutual 
Security .Act that same day, May 23, 1 952 , Scrivner had voted 
no.67 
Scrivner continued to place a negative vote on Mutual 
Security legislation up to the time that his seat was filled 
66congressional Record , 82 Cong ., 2 Ses s ., p. 5815. 
67 Ibid., p. 5917. The amendment to the appropriations 
bill pro~osed by Representative John Vorys also was to strike 
out the f 408,000,000, replacing it with the lower fi gure of 
#208 ,800,000 for international development. The measure was 
passed. 
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by Representative Newell George in 1958. His chief concern 
remained with the hug e national debt; the Government must 
reduce both appropriations and expenditures in order to 
reduce taxes, and Congress had the power to do this if it 
had the will, he implied. The authority, he continu ed , rests 
with Congress, and Congress should not pass n ew l egislation 
when r evenue to pay t he price is not in the national purse. 
REPRESENTATIVE SMITH 
Oh1 You say we cannot fight communism with bombs--
I a gree, but you ca,n fight an idea with a better idea--
if you back up your idea with planning and money.68 
Thus spoke Representative Wint Smith from the Kansas 
Sixth Congressional District in a discussion on aid to Greece 
and Turkey. The con s equence of not aiding these two countries 
seemed much more serious to Smith than the cost of aiding 
them. His vote in favor of sending aid to Greece and Turkey 
was based on the premise t hat by building the strength of 
these two countri es the United Stat es was building the offen-
siv e power of the latter a gainst an aggressive force, supported 
by the communist nations, from the mountains of Greece, Thi s 
Greek-Turkish aid would break t he policy of appeasing Russia . 
Actual belligerency between the aggressive forces of 
communism and the forces of the Royal troops of King George II 
68congressional Record, 80 Cong ., 1 Sess ., p. 4959. 
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of Greece prompted Smith to vote 11 yea 11 on Greek-Turkish aid. 69 
However, in 1 948 Smith refused to join the supporters of 
Marshall Plan aid; voted aga inst any aspect of it, except 
amendments or clauses reducing or limit i ng the amount of aid 
authorized; and affiliated with those legislators who preached 
the principle of never allowing such leg islation to pass in 
Congress in tha t year of 1 948 or in any future years. He, 
thus became a member of the "psuedo-conse rva tives. 11 70 
The members of the bloc voting against t h e Marshall 
Plan were frequently branded a s isolat ionists. Smith , as well 
as other men who were la.bled as isolationist s , opposed the 
aid plan, objected to having 400,000 displaced person s co rn i ng 
into the country, and d isagreed with tho s e in f avor of sending 
.American troops to help partition Palestine. 
In a lengthy speech before the House on March 25 , 1 948, 
Srni th denounced the Marshall Plan proposal. He descri bed 
the plan as a device of propaganda artis ts to obtain money 
(of which only twenty per cent would be used for foo d while 
the remainder would b e used to purchase sh ort suppli e s in the 
United States in order to aid a socialistic Europe), keep 
inflationary conditions existing in the United States, and 
keep the taxes beyond the means of the taxpayer s of the 
69rb1d., Smith's vote in favor of the Greek-Turkish 
loan may be found in the Congressional Record, 80 Cong ., 1 Sess ., 
p. 3793. 
7°see Ch. II, p. 12, ftn. 13. 
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United States. Since the World Bank declared t he European 
countries a poor risk the United States was asked to send 
money to Europe as a g ift, and this money, Smith for ecasted, 
would be used by the European countri es to pay r epa r ations 
to Russia. Ireland was on the list of thos e countri e s 
receiving aid, and ye t Ireland had not aided the Alli es 
during the Secon d Wor ld War. In f a ct, Smith con tinued , the 
policy would assist countrie s defeated by t he Alli es in t h e 
war, which was a complete rev ersal of h istoric tradition. 
Th is should not be done, and Smith s ta ted his opinion by 
recalling the United St a t e s Gov ernment's policy a ft er the 
Civil War; a policy t ha. t l e ft t he South the obli ga tion of 
self-reconstruction. 
Mutual Security, h e fel t , was not good, in tha t friend-
ship cannot be purchased with money; h ence, it is i mpossible 
to hav e a united fron t consist ing of heterog eneous countries 
grouped to fi ght communism. The fallacy in stopping communism 
by aid programs is in the fact t ha t countri es receiving the 
aid are really not t h r eatened by communism. Countries lik e 
Ireland, England , Denmark, Holland , and Iceland, countries 
receiving the majority of the aid, are f a r from falling into 
t he grip of the hammer and sickle, Smith argued. 71 
If the threat of war is a.s grea t as evidence s eems to 
7lcongressional Rec ord, 80 Cong ., 2 Sess., p. 3568. 
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indicate, Smith concluded at this time, he would s pend the 
money authorized in the plan for building American defenses. 
Moreov er , if loan s were made to European countri es the United 
St a tes should ask Fr ance for bases in Al geri a , Engl and for 
island s in the Caribbean Sea , and minerals from Norway . 
Smith would ask f or something in r e t urn from all countri es 
receiving t h i s aid money.72 
Probably his greatest critici sm of the proposa l was 
tha t he felt it was bribing Europe int o stopping Rus s ia while 
allowing the United St a t e s t o r emain indirectly concerned 
with the· whol e matter. Smith could. not bel iev e a bri be of 
t h is type would work . It would be too costly an attempt a t 
indirect methods. The only true method would be the d irect 
approach, whereby t he United St a t es would draw t he lin e , warn 
Russia, and inflict punishment by destroying the base of the 
enemy if the line is cro ssed .73 The United. St a t es shou ld by 
no means supply mater i a l to t h e potent i a l enemy if war was 
as clo se as the St a t e Depa rtment claimed it to be. 
In conclud i ng his speech , Smith stated: 
We shou ld not adopt the Marshall Pl an . Let us s tick 
to what we hav e learned from our own exper ience. Let 
us not invest America's free-ent erpri se earnings in 
sociali s tic schemes in Europe . We can be sympa thet ic 
and g enerous bu t l et us do i t on an out-and-out char ity 
7 2Ibid. 
73Ibid. 
basis--such as Hoov e r administered relief after World 
War I with funds donated by the generous peopl e of 
.America •.•• 
••• I believe the people of America have had enough 
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of our top-fligh t policy makers looking off at the far-off 
horizon of forei gn shores. Let us start looking abou t 
us and build the internal economy of our own country by 
reducing public spending , cutting taxes, and paying off 
our_deb14 In short--we have had enough of forei gn star gazing . 
These were the main a r guments given by Sm ith for his 
vote against the Marshall Pl an .75 He added new angl es to 
these basic vi ews in t he yea.rs when n ew discussion on foreign 
aid opened in the Hou se . He was rela tively taci turn during 
the l att er sessions , however. 
Sm ith also feared that the Executive branch would 
demand more power in order to carry out the functi ons of the 
pl an . This he did not favor • 
.A s may be expected , Smith rose in support of all amend-
men t s lowering appropriations t o the aid fund . 76 Smith 
improvised a way to show the people of his district just how 
much the plan would cost ea ch person in t ha t district . One 
fi gure released by him plac ed a $1 29 . 11 burden on each person 
in the Sixth District.77 
74r bid ., p. 3569. 
75Ibid ., p. 3874. 
76A good. example of this can be found in the Congres-
siona.l Record, 80 Cong ., 2 Sess., p . 3818, where he supported 
the Vursell Amendment tha t reduced funds. 
77Topeka Daily Capital, February 19 , 1 948 , p . 16. 
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Smith also felt tha t if the Marshall Plan were to be 
passed, Spain should be included in the prog r am . This desire 
of his was somewhat paradoxical in that he proposed to aid 
Spain and no other countries. He explained his position by 
the following stat ement: 
Why do not these proponents of this ' g ive-away plan' 
want to help Spain? Because the leftwinge rs and pinks 
would say we cannot help France; he is a Fascist. So, 
it is not an honest defens e prog ram or they would put 
Spain into the program. Yet, military experts tell us 
the Russians can overrun Europe in 6 weeks. A first-
class a r my in Spa in could mak e a n inv as ion most costly.78 
Along with many believers in the "Am erica n First" 
ideolog y Sm ith believed communism to be America 's grea test 
dang er a nd he worried about the s p r ead of t hi s "disease" 
in America. He could not imag ine the Presiden t of the United 
States asking for billions of dollars to build up 11 defen se s 
a gainst world-wide communism" without first chec king communism 
in the United States. 
The people b a c k home c annot understand why we s pend 
billions of dollars to stop communism in Europe and 
apparently ta k e no official action to stop it in the 
Unit ed States.79 
Wint Smith became a mar ke d man m respect to his 
sta nd a g$.inst forei gn aid. He was viewed by some as be,ing 
an enemy of the United Stat e s. "Becau se of his sentiments 
.•. Cong ressman Smith has b e en named one of the country's 
78congressional Record, 80 Cong ., 2 Sess., p. 3569 . 
79rbid., p. Al806. 
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[fourteen] f oremost enemies by the New Republ ic •.•• 11 80 Smith 
was fearful that the economic policy of t he United States con-
sisted of s p ending its elf into bankruptcy. "There is no 
such thing as security in a _bankrupt co untry. 11 81 
Every taxpayer should know what the country was d o ing , 
Smith stated , and forei gn a.id , as t h e Un i ted St a t es was apply-
ing it, was invitin g disast e r. The Governmen t of the United 
States was spending money abroad for t h e improvemen t of 
p roduction of such items as wool an d other a g ricultura l 
80stratton, " Stratton Writes," J anua ry 6, 1950, p. 4. 
Representativ e Shafer of Mich i gan submitted to the Congres-
sional Re cord an article con c e rning Wint Smith wri tten by 
Jack Williams , Wa s h i ng ton Corresponden t of t h e Kansas City 
Star . I n this article the author describ es Sm i th a s a l arge , 
plain man who a ggressively battles adherents of forei gn a id 
and l abor uni on l eaders . T4 e au t ho r clas s ifies Smith as 
running a close second. to Ta f t as being t h e mo s t h a ted man 
in Congress by the Fair Dealers . He votes "no" more times 
on Fair Deal proposals t han any other Congres s man, the author 
states. "The l ab e l s pas t ed on h i m do not worr y Mr . Smith . 
He cracks b a c lt a t t aun ts of forei gn ai d a dvocat e s with 
1 Truman 's internat ional W.P.A. '" Another speculation offered 
by the author of this article as to why Smith dislikes New 
and Fair Dealers is tha t many of the politician s associ a t ed 
with Truman 's Administration or "Brain Trus t ers 11 a r e Ha rvard 
men while Sm i th is a Yale gr adua t e . Willi ams also state s in 
this article t ha t Smith r epres ented an area whi ch was 
characterized by 11 fre e -enterprise" and anti-Fa ir Deal t hough t. 
Smith is amazed at t he l arg e national debt an d t he p r a ctice 
of deficit spendin g , which, as Smith believes, l eads a country 
to socialism; and bipa rtisan politics will continue to map 
the course for planned economy, "I p r e fer this g roun d [consti-
tutional g ov e rnmentJ to the quicksands of politica l expediency 
[always-a-crisis g overnment] ••• , 11 Sm. i th says. 11 They still 
talk about the 'four fre edoms' and brotherhood of man, whi le 
a g ang of deep-freeze experts a r e stealing some ot the 30 
fr eedoms the American people by our Constitution, . added Smith. 
81Ibid. 
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products that were surplus items in the United States . This 
would cause more world surplus es, shut off further American 
overseas markets, and bring more decreases in pric es . He 
did not blame Truman for t his condition as he felt the 
President could not spend money tha t Cong ress d i d not a ppro -
pri ate .82 
In 1 950 , Smith proposed an amendment "to drop from 
next y e a r's fund the sum of $150, 000 , 000," the total unex-
pended amount for the 1 950 fis cal year.83 The amendment , 
however, was defea t ed i n the Hou se b y a vote of 1 54 to 103 . 
Preaching for a balanced budg et, to which he firmly 
believed the people of the country were entitled to , Smith 
c ontinued to vote a gainst all aid in an y form. He ma de the 
follo wi n g statemen t in 1 951: 
The peopl e are demanding an ans wer to just wha t is 
to be our policy in the matter of national defense . 
They full well know we have had no est ablished policy 
in forei g n affairs except t o tr
84
to buy wi t h tax dollars 
a false economy and well-being . 
He assert ed tha t for e i gn aid was illog ical sin ce the 
countries receiving a id had reduced their forei gn debts by 
$1 ,202 ,300 ,000 as a result of this a i d while the Unite d Sta tes 
went $5,000 ,000 ,000 mor e in debt ov er the s ame period of time. 8 5 
8 2stratton, " Stratton Write s, 11 March 22 , 1 950 , p. 4. 
83Topeka Daily Capital, March 31, 1 950 , p. 12. 
84congressi on a l Record, 82 Cong ., 1 Ses s ., p. A715. 
85stratton, "Stra tton Writes," April 2 , 1 95 1 , p. 4. 
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During the discussion on continuing aid to England in 1951, 
Smith formulat ed the theory t ha t United St a t es a id, the t ax 
dollar s of t h e ci t izens of t h e United St a t es, wer e fu rthering 
t h e na tionalizat ion of industry in Grea t Bri t ain. It was 
clear to him tha t t he coopera tion r eceived i n 1951 f r om Great 
Brita i n i n not selling preci ous ma teri als to China. came a s a 
result of a British d e s ire to obta in a i d for na tiona liza tion 
of t h e oil i ndu s t r y i n Iran within Briti sh socialism. Great 
Britain n e ed ed help in Irani an a f fa i r s , s a id Smith , and Engl and 
wanted t h i s help in the f orm of a i d fr om t h e Un i t ed St a t es. 86 
A published newslett er wri t t en by Smith r ev eal ed the 
reas ons why h e vo ted a ga inst t he loan to Ind i a i n 1 951. 87 
The reasons listed were simila r to t hose a r gum ents he ha d 
us ed to attack previou s forei gn a i d plans, bu t Smith alter ed 
them slightly to fit t his n ew s i tua ti on. He contended t hat 
t here wa s a. surplus in t h e Indian Tr easury of $1 37 , 000 , 000 
in 1950, while the Treasur y of t he United Stat es had no sur-
plus to loan India; that sta rva tion of people i n Ind i a was 
not an ascerta i n ed f act, and many p eople in t he Uni ted St a t e s 
were hungry; t ha t it wa s not a loan, only a gift; t ha t the 
gov ernment of Indi a would n ev er fi gh t the Chinese; t ha t India 
refus ed. to sell the United St a t e s valuable minerals; and tha t 
h e had pledged himself to vote t he taxpayers' money only on 
86stratton, "Stratton Writes, 11 April 2, 1951, p. 4. 
87stratton, ''Stratton Writes," May 31, 1951, p. 4. 
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projects of direct defensive spending, not on policies dis-
tributing money to peoples on the earth without receiving a 
return for the loans. 
Each "State of the Union" speech presented by Presi-
d.ent Truman was criticized by Smith, especially those remarks 
made by the President conc erning foreign aid policies. These 
statements of policy were ca ricatur ed by Smith as being "Pie-
In-Sky Politics. 1188 Whenever the new President, Dwight David 
Eis enhower , stressed a continu a tion of high taxes i n both 
individual and corporation taxes, Smith a ga in sharpened his 
critical axe. As he stated: 
If I voted a gainst t hing s when Truman was President , 
I can't in good conscience chang e overnigh t •••• 
•••• after a l l, I'v e got to live with myself and I'm 
not g oing to follow along on some issues tha t I think 
are detrimen t a l to the country 's welfa re and the people 
in my district.89 
A continuat ion of forei gn a i d s eemed detrimental to 
t he people of Smith's area . He bas ed. his judgment on a 
premise that European countri e s were balancing their budge ts 
with American money when they could balance their own budg ets 
by a wise policy of economy, 90 and. a majority of the people 
of his district seeming ly backed his stand. By a poll t a ken 
88Topeka Daily Capital, January 10, 1 952 , p. 1. 
89 11While Eisenhower Proposes The Old Guard Disposes," 
Life (36:133, June 21), 1954. 
90stratton, "Stratton Write s,'' June 8, 1 953~ p. 4. 
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in 1951, Smith found that p eople in his district did not 
approv e , by a vote of 741 nays to 116 yea.s, t h e propo sal of 
economic as well as milita r y aid to t h e na tions of the North 
Atlantic Tr eaty Organ iza ti on .91 
Wint Smith continued his vot e agains t all f or eign a id 
fro m t he time he voted aga i nst t h e Marshall Pl an to t h e t i me 
h e ret ired fro m Congre ss i n 1960 . He vot ed for all r educ t i ons 
in the appropri a ti ons, and wa s a.n activ e memb er of t h e economy-
minded noninterventi oni s ts i n Congress. 
REPRESENTATI VE MYRON V. GEORGE 
Republican Myr on V. Georg e , Represent a tiv e fr om t h e 
Third Congres s iona l Dis t rict i n Kans as , wh o repl aced Repre-
sent a t i ve Meyer on November 7, 1950, a s a r e sult of the 
latter's dea th , vi ewed t h e Truman and Secretar y of Stat e Dean 
Ache s on forei gn policy a s one of fa i lur e. He d i d no t approv e 
of United Sta tes foreign polici es b eing c ondu c t ed on t he basis 
of "fear. 11 92 He wrote t h e people i n his district t ha t: 11We .•• 
9lstratton, " Stratton Write s, 11 April 20 , 1 951, p . 4. 
Ano t h er article in the Salina Journal, reprin ted in the 
article, "Clif Stratton Writes, 11 Topeka Daily Capi tal, J ul y 17, 
1954, p. 4, contests the opinion tha t Smith r epresent s the 
ma jority thinking of his district. Smith's die-har d tactics 
a r e a sl ap a t President Eis enh ower, who is popular in Kans as, 
and may produce ill fe eling among Kansa s people. Howev er, 
Smith has b e en successful in r e turn ing to Wa sh ington only 
b ecau s e he h a s had no 11 vigorous and effectiv e opponent." 
92stratton , "Strat ton Writ es," Januar y 15, 1951, p. 4. 
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are being guided by a policy of fear •••. Because of this 
fear, we are losing the initiative. 11 93 Georg e wanted a 
partisan approach to the debate on foreign aid a s well as all 
debate because he believed absolute control by one party or 
bipartisan politics led the country to war .94 
His suspicion of forei gn aid as devis ed by the Tr uman 
Administra tion prompted Myron George to vote a gainst t he 
legislation in 1 951. However , George voted for t he plan in 
1952 , due to the f a ct tha t the Vorys amendment was adop t ed 
which cut the international development fund for that year 
from $408,000,000 to $208,800 ,000. He was also happy wi th 
the amendment offered by Representa tive Fred Lewis Crawford 
wh ich cut the tota l for Mutua l Security from $3,273, 824,750 
to $3,128, 224,750. He voted i n f avor of t he l egislat ion in 
1953 , but in 1 954 Georg e a ga in r eg i s tered a "nay 11 vot e , pri-
marily for t he reason tha t cuts in the total appropriations 
were turned down. I n 1 955 George r e turned t o t he favorable 
side , voting "yea ." 
George's voting r ecord probably dep ended upon the 
amount of deductions or cu ts made in the total appropriated 
ea ch year for Mutual Security leg isla tion. This conclu s ion 
is made by examining the inconsistency in his voting pa ttern 
93rbid. 
94congressional Record, 83 Cong ., 2 Sess., p . 882. 
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and in the statement made by him in 1959: 
Often I wonder •.• if it would not be wise for America 
to withdraw completely from the foreign-aid picture 
as it now exists, thereby leaving the field to Communist 
Russia. If this were done, Russia would have to spread 
her resources so thin that she could accomplish little 
in any one country. Our aid could then be g iven upon 
application by the various countries, and they would 
most certainly be cognizant o~ the source of that assis-
tance.95 
George, however, continued in the late years of his 
term in Cong ress to support forei gn aid in the hope tha t this 
prog ram would chang e from a g ift basis to a long -term loan 
policy. 
REPRESENTATIVE MILLER 
Democrat Howard S . Miller from the First Congres-
sional District in Kansas took office as a replacement of 
Albert Cole after the 1 952 election. This Democra tic Repre-
sentative immediat ely supported the Emerg ency Famine Relief 
Authority and aid in the form of whe a t to Pak ista n for the 
basic reason that he felt it was t h e humanita rian thing to 
do. He stated: 
We cannot, even if we would, shirk our responsibility 
as a Nation without compromi sing ourselves as individ-
uals. We must not, and we cannot do it. We intend to 
meet the wants of our fellow men in Pakistan. There is 
no doubt as to that. It is only a qu e stion of the spirit 
in which we shall do it •••• let us g i v e this relief , not 
because they are in a position to return the favor. Let 
us not g ive even as a matter of duty. Let us g ive it 
95con~ressional Record, 86 Cong ., 1 Sess ., p. A6105. 
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because they are fellow human beings •••• 96 
In this spirit Miller, during his short tour of one 
term in Congress, supported t h e Mutual Security Acts of 1953 
and 1954. 
REPRESENTATIVE AVERY 
The Eisenhower Administration , in the opinion of 
Representat ive William Henry Avery from the First Congres-
sional Distric t in Kansas, based forei gn aid spending on 
national security alone. I n 1954, Avery stated to voters 
in his d i strict tha t his concepts concerning a forei gn policy 
were based particula rly on the following point s : 
1. To insure a strong free America I favor: a. 
Economic and politica l alliances wi th friendl y nations . 
97 b. Financial and ma te r i a l assistance to friendly nations. 
His attitude seems to have become somewhat modified to 
t h e extent that funds for forei g n aid should be a ppropri a ted 
only whe n they are necessary for the defense of the United 
States. He wrote: 
Everyone will a g r e e there is great dang er in the 
g eneral world situation today a n d that the United St a tes 
must do everything it can, within reason, to conta in and 
limit the spread of commun ism. As an Ca] means to help 
us achieve this g oal , I think g enerally the mutual 
96conp;res sional Record, 83 Cong ., 1 Sess ., p. 7086. 
97nTop Kansas Candidates Give Their Views On Ma.in 
Election Issues To Women Voters," Topeka Dai1,y Capital (Octo-
ber 31, 1954), p. A21. 
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security program has been successful.98 
Avery remained friendly in his attitude toward the 
Mutual Security Prog ram; however, he wanted a thorough review 
made of the work done in this prog r a m and the results of the 
plan obtained. Some chang es, he argued, could be made in 
the operation of the prog ram to achieve efficiency . 
In concluding this discussion of Avery 's attitude 
toward forei g n aid , one more point must be included. Avery 
noted t hat thirty percent of United St a tes forei gn aid or 
$16,000,000,000 has been spent for surplus a g ricultural pro-
ducts, and tha t eighty percent of the a id "is s p ent for 
1199 commodi t ies g rown and products manufactured in t h i s cou ntry . 
From his fir s t session in Congress in 1 959 to 1960, 
Ave·r y voted in favor of t he Mu t ual Security Ad ministrati on . 
REPRESENTAT I VE BREEDI NG 
James Floyd Breeding , Democratic Representative from 
the Fifth Cong ressional District in Kan sas, respond ed to the 
Mutual Security Admi n istration leg isla t ion i n a c autious 
manner, but always with an affirma tive vote. He r e sented the 
secrecy surrounding the program and many questions disturbed 
him. He desi~ed answers to some questions before he cast 
98Newsletter enclosed in letter, William Aver y to 
Darrell Munsell dated February 25 , 1960. 
ggibid. 
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his vote. Some of these uncertaint ies were : reports by 
responsible Congressi onal committees r e l at ing tremendous 
wastes in the prog ram; forei gn aid funds spent to finance 
dams, rural electric lines , and economic development abroad 
when the above were needed in the Unit ed Stat e s. All the 
answers to these questions were not supp lied to Breeding , but 
he voted in f avor of the 11 packag e 11 leg islation in spite of 
his disapproval of leg islation i n "packag e" form. He preferred 
to vote on a separate basis, that is, mil i tary a i d and then 
economic appropriations. It was a gainst his judgmen t to 
vote for $3, 200 ,000, 000 additional to an already unexpended 
$ 6,200,000,000 with $1,000 ,000 ,000 counterpart funds in 1 957. 
Economic aid , he felt, should have been eliminatad fro m the 
$3,200,000,000, l eaving just _ funds for milita ry assistance . 100 
All economic aid should be limi ted to ju s t farm surplus pro-
ducts . "Communism," said Breeding , 11 t hrives on the diffi-
culties of other people. 11 lOl .A s far as Breeding was con cerned, 
the difficulti e s of the world gener a lly were b a s ed on hunger. 
The ideal way to conduct a world economic promotional 
lOOcongr~ssional Record, 85 Cong ., 1 Bess., pp. 1 2224-
25. Breeding was in f avor of sending surplus agricultura l 
g oods to Europe under the Public Law 4 80 . This l aw exchanged 
United States surplus agricultural g oods to fri endly countries 
in return for their forei g n currency. This currency in turn 
would be u sed to expand forei gn economics, to ma inta in United 
States public officials abroad, or trade stra teg ically nece-
ssary materials. 
lOlcongressional Record, 86 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 6140. 
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plan, Breeding concluded, would be to elimina te the develop-
ment loan fund, with its low rat e s and outright g ifts, and 
replace these funds with a,n extended Export-Import Bank .102 
In 1959 Breeding told his constituents that: 
I vot ed for every reduction ~repos ed on the floor •••• 
I am c onvinced that th e amount $400,000,000 could be 
further reduced without crippling the prog ram .... If 
Cong re s s r educed the amount available, it c ould well 
force the a dmin istrators to tighten up their proc edures 
so the money will go further.103 
Breeding , howev er , vot ed in favor of co nt inuing the 
Mutua l Security Administra tion in 1 959. 
REPRESENTA TIVE NEWELL A. GEORGE 
Democrat Newell A. Georg e was elected to t he House of 
Representatives in 1 958, defeating the incumbent Scrivner. 
Georg e did not wish to be consid ered as an opponen t of the 
Mutual Security Prog ram, but he wa n t ed some of the waste and 
extravag ance cut from forei gn aid as a mean s to increa se the 
development loan pro g ram or Point Four Prog ram. He stated 
in Apri l, 1 959: 
I do agree ••. that the emphasis [on foreign aid] should 
4 be placed on long -term loan s and technic a l assi s tance ..• lO 
George voted 11 Yea 11 on Mutua l Security appropriation s 
102congressional Record, 85 Cong ., 1 Sess ., p . 12224. 
103Newsletter from James Floyd Breeding dated June 1 9 , 
1 959 , p. 2. 
l04congressiona l Record, 86 Cong ., 1 Sass., p. 5680. 
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in 1 958 and 1959. 
R.E.PRESENTATIVE HARGIS 
Democratic Representa tive Denver David Ha r g i s , Kansas 
Cong ressman from the Third District, advoca ted debt r eduction. 
The Government , he believ ed, should take steps in the direc-
tion of limiting the debt, and forei g n aid r eduction, he 
thought, would b e an excellent place to beg in thi s step. 
He expressed this point of view in a l et t er to the au t hor as 
follows: 
I feel t ha t t h e g overnmen t is spending a grea t deal 
too much on forei gn aid. If the g ov ernment would dis-
continue forei gn aid, they could not only pay off the 
Na t ional debt, but taxes could be reduced as well. I 
find that here in Washing ton the g ov ernmen t is more 
concerned a bou t trying to bui ld up forei gn trade~ wh ich 
is detrimental to our own industries and work e r s , than 
it is to help American indu stri e s. As anyone can s e e 
this is an injustice to our men tha t ar,e l aid off because 
of lack of work .105 
Hargis, for t hese reasons, could not vo te for the 
continuation of foreign a i d to Europe in the 1 959 vote in t h e 
Hou se of Representativ es . 
l05Letter from Denv e r D. Hargis to Darrell Muns ell, 

















RECORDED VOTE IN HOUSE ON FOREIGN AID BILLS 
1947- 1959 
Bills: 
Greek-Turkish Loan xx 0 0 ox 
Interim Aid to Europe xx xx 0 0 
Marshall Plan xx xx 0 0 
Economic Cooperation Act xx x x X 0 
Economic Cooperation Act X X 0 0 0 0 
Mutual Security Act Ii X 0 0 Ii 0 
Mutual Security Act xx 0 0 ox 
Mutual Security Act X 0 0 ox 
futual Security Act X 0 0 0 0 
Mutual Security Act X 0 0 0 •~ X 
Mutual Security Act X X. 0 0 # X 
Mutual Security Act 0 0 0 # xx 
Mutual Security Act 0 0 ox xx 
Mutual _Securitz Act - 0 0 xxxo 
KEY: X-yea. vote 
0-nay vote 
#-not vot :ing 
• ,-paired in favor 
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Those years following the Second World War were filled 
with troublesome problems for the United States in relation 
to world affairs. The Truman Administration had to subor-
dinate its domestic problems, to a large ext ent, in order to 
solve the vexing interna tional problems. Kansas people were 
not altogether ready for a tota l abandonment of domestic pro-
blems, at lea.st not those problems concerning high taxes, the 
national debt, high prices, and farm income. Even if the 
other members in the Congress were willing to discuss mea-
sures geared to internationa l policy, the Kansas Senators and 
Representatives were quick to tr and bind thinking on domestic 
affairs with interna tional policy as a way of instigating 
solutions for perplexities in the United States while solving 
international problems. In thi s way the problem of agri-
cultural surpluses could be conveniently re-shaped to fit into 
solutions for international measures. As such , Represen ta ti v e 
Hope suggested the continuance of a price support program for 
farm products during those years after World War II, which 
were years when almost everybody wanted lower taxes with lower 
prices. He could thus stress the importance of farm sur-
pluses, advocating even a larger surplus than that in existence 
at that time, as being the backbone of any foreign aid program. 
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Senator Capper could easily see the importance of food 
to a hungry world, and Cole endorsed a plan designed to trade 
food for strateg ic materials in Europe . Carlson believed 
food was more effective in combatting communism than guns. 
No matter what form the plan of forei g n aid would t ake, Kan-
sas men conveniently held to an ideology which made food the 
key to any plan of aiding Europ e•. That such an ideology bene-
fited t heir constituents was h a rdly coinciden t a l, and the 
semi-isola tionism of the State was r e flect ed in the ir a ctions. 
The bluntness of such a policy cou l d be nea tly cov ered by the 
broad and popul a r argument tha t they favored humanitarian 
a i d . 
Benefits from for e i gn aid prog rams to sect ions of the 
United Stat e s excluding Kans~.s were v iew ed s kept ica lly by the 
delegation. Who in Kan s as would wa n t to pay taxes for the 
support of the Americ a n tobacco growers ? Re e s did not . He 
could not agree with the policy of sending tobacco to Europe 
as a relief product. His inte rest in forei gn aid, as was the 
interest of most of the Kansas Representatives and Sen a tors 
voting in favor of aid programs during any one y ear of t h is 
period , wa s narrowly directed to t he problem of the Kansas 
whea t surplus. All the members in Cong ress from Kansas had 
t he a gricultural surplus problem in the center or nea r the 
center of their interests, but they all did not agree that 
forei g n aid prog rams would answ er tha t problem; and quite 
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frequently those that might agree one year chang ed their 
minds the next year. For an example of this, Hope would 
stand by forei gn a id. measures that were wrapped in elements 
of military aid., c ounterpart fund s , increasing European 
indus trial output , supporting f oreig n deb t reduc tion s, or 
measures raising taxes in the United States long er than Rees, 
Scrivner , Meyer , Schoeppel, or Hargi s would, mainly because 
he believ ed foreign aid a g ood answer to the a gricultural 
surplus problem. He would not join his c ontempor aries in 
Cong ress in voting a gainst forei gn aid measures because they 
were plans that assisted socialistic countrie s or were plans 
inefficiently administered. He saw these dang ers and was 
willing to improve aid measures, but he was not willing to 
completely defea t these aid prog rams in Congress because of 
these critic isms. Hargis saw the advantage s of sending fo od 
around the world, but, to him, the effort of aid programs 
as devised by past Congresses entailed sending almost every-
thi n g overseas, thus raising taxes , p rices, and the n a tional 
debt in the United States. Schoeppel , Rees, and Meyer were 
in a g reement with Hargis. The a id pro grams of the United 
States were, to these three men, too expensive a device to 
rid the country of food surpluses. 
Most of the Kansas group in Washing ton was willing to 
have bipartisan debate on forei gn aid. It was not a Republi-
can view that forei gn aid spending was too expensive nor was 
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it a Democratic assumption that any foreign aid prog ram was 
the only effective weapon to fi ght communism s h ort of war to 
these Kansa s men. Over the nation and over the years some 
Republicans viewed the measures concerning foreign aid as a 
necessity for the Uni te.d States whil e some did not. Democrats 
were in much the same position. Of the group of eight Kansas 
Republicans in Congress in 1948, only two voted a gainst the 
Marshall Plan tha t had been proposed by a Democratic Adminis-
tration. This plainly indica ted the bipartisan na ture wh ich 
the Kansas men considered necessary for foreign aid debate. 
Senator Reed was willing to vote for the Marshall Plan, 
although he did. not like the plan as it had been proposed by 
the Administration , for the r eason that a bipartisan approach 
to this matter was a much sa~er avenue to take . He fea red 
the defeat of the plan would split the Republican Party 
immedi a t e ly before the 1948 Presidential elections . Another 
Republican, Wint Smith , d id not view the Marshall Plan as a 
threa t to Republican solida rity. He did n ot vote ag ainst the 
Marshall Plan because he con sidered it as a Democratic inven-
tion for, as he stated, the party formula t i ng th e plan made 
little difference to him. He wa s a gainst any forei gn aid 
prog r a m whethe r it was drawn up by the Democrats or Repub-
licans. After 1 952 he still r efused to vote for forei gn 
aid measures that t he Republican Eisenhower Administration 
had outlined. Smith was more faithful to his reasoning on 
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foreign aid measures than Schoeppe·1, who entered the ranks 
of partisanship during 1957 when Republican persuasion con-
verted him to the vi ew that military aid was a n ecessity to 
the Republican foreign policy of the United States . This 
partisan pressure had only a small effect of short duration 
upon Schoeppel, for he was never happy with the fi gure appro-
priated for the ena.c tion of the 1 957 MS.A , and he again slapped 
the Eisenhower Administration in the face by voting against 
the 1958 MSA . In 1 958 and. 1959, Democrats Bre eding and 
Newell George voted for the Ei senhower forei gn aid propo sal 
in each of those two years while Republi cans Rees and Smi th 
refused to go along wi th their party on foreign a i d l eg is-
l ation. Partisan debate on forei gn a id matters was not a 
factor in t he discussion as far as the Kansas Senators and 
Representatives were concerned. 
Quite frequently the Kansans would join colleagues 
in work ing for revisions in forei gn aid measures. Reed 
joined. nineteen other Republican Senators in the revisionist 
group in 1948, a group advocat ing alteration s to t h e Marshall 
Plan proposal. Some of this group's suggestions for the plan 
came into direct conflict with Senator Vandenberg, and Reed, 
desiring to prevent a split in the Republican Party, modified 
his thinking when Vandenberg directly opposed the r evisions 
advocated by the group of twenty Senators. However, after 
1948, Reed a gain returned to the battle for revi sion s in the 
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foreign aid programs. Schoeppel, after he was convinced by 
Republican pressure in the form of party ethics to vote for 
the Eisenhower MSA leg islation, worked harder than before to 
obtain revisions in subsequent forei gn aid bills. Schoeppel 
really wanted a bill that would send only military equipment 
to Europe to fortify the military troops of the United States 
without sending economic aid to the countri es of Europe. This 
is hardly forei gn aid when only American troops benefit from 
t h e money sent abroad by the United States, yet Schoeppel 
d.id not mak e this distinction. Rees constantly stressed 
the need for revision in forei gn aid measures. His alterations 
consisted simply of less money sent abroad . All Kansans in 
Congress, in 1959 , fav ·ored a loan pro gr am over a direct aid 
program. 
A.l though the humanitarian purpose of forei gn aid was 
a major factor in the thinking of the members of Congress, 
it was not the only important factor. Cole's strategic 
material program whereby food would be traded for European 
material; Hope's program of sending fo od to Europe to rid the 
United States of surplus agricultural products; and Carlson's 
desire to use food as the chief weapon a gainst communism 
were plans that were not only partly humanitarian in nature, 
a policy of which all members of Congress were ostensibly in 
favor, but were ways of ex tending or gaining markets overseas 
while feeding the hungry of the world. Cole, as well as Capper, 
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Hope, and Carlson, wanted the United States to be the chi e f 
supplier of food for the world. The United States was to 
replace the Ukraine as the European source of food, ensured 
against Canadian competition by the International Wheat 
Agreement that produced guaranteed markets by contract for 
the United States in return for the economic aid s ent to 
Europe. 
Europe should be aided, at least nominally, Cole, Hope, 
Breeding , and Carlson believed, but the United St ate s had to 
guard itself again st Europe as a competitor. The European 
industrial plant should be re-mad e in t he form of a supple-
mentary part of t h e greater industri al syst em of the United 
States. In sho rt, as Scrivne r proscribed , Europe h ad. to be 
Americanized. The economi es- sho ld b e tha t system of cooper-
ation where one unit would supply the nesds of the other. 
Cole would not raise the industrial lev el of Europe mu ch 
beyond t he pre-World War II days; Hope and Capper would allow 
American dollars to reach Europ e as a way to pr omote a r ecov-
ered Eu ropean economy based on an i ndustry in Eu rope l arg e 
enough to ensure stability in Europe but not l a r ge enough to 
flood the world with European goods . Eu rope had to rais e its 
own standard of living with assistance from the United States, 
and once the stability of Europe was obtained Capper demanded 
that the United States should terminate all aid. 
Rees and Smith criticized the American forei gn aid 
120 
plans because they believed the United States was trying to 
raise the standard of living throughout the world by aid 
money, which, as they maintained, was impossible. They 
argued tha t such a policy would force the United States into 
bankruptcy, and allow socialism to fill the vacuum l eft by 
the disintegrated economy of the United States after the 
national debt, high prices, and hi gh taxes brought about this 
bankruptcy. In the thinking of Rees, Scrivner , and Meyer 
the Americanization of Europe was the only way to stop communism, 
and. the only way to Americanize Europe was to take complete 
control in the administration of aid programs. 
While the retired Capper, along wi th the active Smith, 
Ha~gis, Rees, and Schoeppel believed that a continua tion of 
aid to Europe would leave the United Sta t es with socialism 
as the only alternative, a more optimistic oppositi on was 
formed by Ho pe , Myron George , Newell George , and Avery. 
The latter men stress the point that t here would. be a dollar 
for dollar return of the aid sent to Europe in the form of 
i ncreased productivity in the American economy owing to a 
stimulation of production created by the demand of more goods 
to be sent to Europe. This new marke t would g ive more employ-
ment to people of t he United State s , as they interpreted it, 
by calling for increased producti on of these goods needed in 
Europe, and, subsequently, these goods, once received in Europe , 
would put the European people back to work. · An increased 
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level of economy, created by a fuller employment, both in 
Europe and in the Unit ed States, was the strengt~h needed in 
a defense against Soviet Communism. All the Kansans in 
Congress were interested in an ad equate defense for the United 
States, but they disagreed with each other on just wha t was 
adequate, and in the steps to be taken in establishing this 
defense. To Meyer, the Marshall Plan was the end of a policy 
of appeasing the Soviet Union; but continuing aid programs, 
as they were introduced in the House of Representa tives, 
became, to him, demands on the Tr easur y of the United States 
for inefficiently controlled funds reaping insignificant 
returns. To Smith and Schoeppel, the only effective weapon 
agains t communism was actual force. This being impossible 
short of war, the United Sta:t,es should then, especially in 
Smith's view, define a lin e at which communism would have to 
halt, prepare the offensiv e force of the United States by 
appropriating the means for strength within its own boundaries , 
and s trike if that line of definition is fractured as a result 
of communist aggression. A mitigatory action of this extreme 
view wa s the policy of those supporting forei gn aid to Europe; 
to strengthen the position of the United States in Europe as 
a pose of threat from a solidified Western Europe. Avery , 
Breeding, and Newell George advocated the latter view when 
they voted in favor of the MSA in 1958 and 1959. 
To vote for foreign aid in Congress would mean a 
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departure from a program of tax reduction and national d.ebt 
reduction in the opinion of most people. Smith, Rees, and 
Hargis beli eved this to be true; a nati on cannot have both a 
progr am of tax and debt reduc t ion and a progr am of forei gn a id. 
Cole did not agree with t h i s as he was inclined to believe 
tha t foreign aid would st i mulat e the economy of t he United 
States in both the areas of production and in the area of 
trade; and, cons equently, as a result of more tax money to be 
collected from an increased profit in the United Stat es , taxes 
could be lowered for t he average citiz en and payments could 
be made on the, n a tional debt with t he increased revenue from 
trade. When Cole advoca t ed his plan of encourag ing foreign 
aid as a way of stimulating Uni t ed Stat e s trade, he chose a 
plan of political convenienc.e. To h i m an advocati on of tax 
reduction in lieu of foreign aid was a policy more dangerous 
t han a plan designed to encourage both t ax and debt reduction 
while granting forei gn a id. As such, Capper, Reed, Hope , and 
Col e could view forei gn a i d f avorably, advocate its acceptance, 
and, at the same time, vote for a bill to reduce the national 
income tax. This plan would please a larger number of the 
constituents than measures designed just to lower taxes or 
legislation stressing just forei gn aid. A broad general 
plan to cover all those items, as the one abov e , would be a 
more desired plan sin ce it was an ideal policy to use for 
political expediency. 
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Foreign aid is likely to continue being a contro-
versial topic. There are still those in the United States who 
believe forei gn aid to countri e s of the world is a necessary 
part of the United States forei gn policy. There are still 
others who do not believe it is a necessity , and bel i eve tha t 
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